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ABSTRACT 
Early during the COVID-19 pandemic, a number of widely-publicized incidents 
gave rise to concerns that holders of patents and other intellectual property (IP) 
rights could hinder the development, manufacture and distribution of essential 
medical devices, protective equipment and biomedical products. The global 
response to these concerns was swift and included the issuance of compulsory 
licensing orders by several national governments, as well as the proposal of a 
technology pool by the World Health Organization (WHO). Alongside these 
efforts, a group of scientific, engineering and legal experts created a lightweight, 
open framework under which IP holders could voluntarily pledge not to assert 
their rights against those responding to the COVID-19 pandemic.  This effort – 
known as the Open COVID Pledge (OCP) – attracted significant participation 
from some of the world’s largest IP holders, with nearly 500,000 patents and 
patent applications, as well as significant copyrighted material, pledged to date. 
The OCP has also been adopted as part of the framework of the WHO’s COVID 
Technology Access Pool (C-TAP), a multinational initiative to make particular 
biomedical innovations more accessible around the world. This article describes 
the development of the OCP, including the design choices that shaped its legal 
structure and implementation. It also assesses the adoption of the OCP across 
market sectors including biopharmaceuticals, diagnostics, medical devices, 
protective equipment and digital innovations. It finds that while pledges in the 
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biopharmaceutical sector have been infrequent, many other critical technologies 
in the fight against COVID-19 have been made broadly available to users 
through this and related pledging mechanisms, creating a favorable 
environment for open innovation, new market entry and  equitable access to 
technology.  As such, the OCP may both help to address the current pandemic 
and serve as a useful model for IP sharing platforms to address to future public 
health emergencies. 
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On December 31, 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) office in 
Beijing was notified that a cluster of idiopathic pneumonia cases had been 
diagnosed in Wuhan, a medium-sized city located in the central Chinese province 
of Hubei.1  On January 9, 2020, the WHO announced that the source of the infection 
was a novel coronavirus,2 subsequently designated SARS-CoV-2. On January 30, 
with nearly 8,000 confirmed cases in China and 100 elsewhere, the WHO 
characterized the outbreak as a public health emergency of international concern.3 
And on March 11, with more than 118,000 cases in 114 countries and 4,200 deaths 
worldwide, the Director-General of the WHO declared that “COVID-19 can be 
characterized as a pandemic”.4 
The international biomedical research community mobilized rapidly in 
response to the escalating crisis. Concerns about patents arose just as quickly. Many 
potential vaccines, diagnostics and treatments for COVID-19 were originally 
targeted at related diseases including malaria, hepatitis C, influenza, Marburg virus, 
Ebola, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS), and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).5 Many of these 
compounds were covered by existing patents and patent applications. One March, 
2020, study by the American Chemical Society identified over 2,000 patents 
relating to SARS and MERS treatments alone.6 These patents were held by a range 
of companies and institutions across North America, Asia and Europe. Another 
study identified over 120 different entities holding patents covering diagnostic tests 
relevant to COVID-19.7 In addition to these biochemical patents, researchers 
identified a large number of patents covering the manufacture, operation and 
components of devices and equipment used to treat the symptoms of COVID-19 
 
 
1 World Health Org., Pneumonia of unknown cause – China, Jan. 5, 2020, 
https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january-2020-pneumonia-of-unkown-cause-china/en/. 




3 World Health Org., WHO Director-General's statement on IHR Emergency Committee on Novel 
Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), Jan. 30, 2020, https://www.who.int/director-
general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-statement-on-ihr-emergency-committee-on-novel-
coronavirus-(2019-ncov). 
4 World Health Org., WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-
19, Mar. 11, 2020, https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-
opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020 
5 Cynthia Liu, et al., Research and Development on Therapeutic Agents and Vaccines for COVID-
19 and Related Human Coronavirus Diseases, ACS CENTRAL SCI., Mar. 9, 2020, 
https://dx.doi.org/10.1021/acscentsci.0c00272 
6 Id.  See also Patents – Coronaviruses, 38 NATURE BIOTECH. 695 (2020) (identifying patents related 
to vaccines and methods of treatment of coronaviruses). 
7 Sagacious IP, Diagnostics/Testing Kits for Coronavirus, May 22, 2020. 
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and to monitor and contain its spread, including respirators, ventilators, diagnostic 
kits, facial masks, algorithms, mobile apps, and the like.8 
Some began to view this sizeable body of patents as a potential impediment to 
research, development, manufacture and distribution of critical supplies, products 
and equipment. Early in the pandemic, a number of high-profile incidents involving 
patents galvanized public concern over these issues.  For example,  
• In February 2020, the Wuhan Institute of Virology announced that it had filed 
a patent application claiming the use of Gilead Sciences’ experimental antiviral 
drug remdesivir to treat COVID-19.9 The announcement caused significant 
controversy, given that the Wuhan Institute did not develop the drug and its 
effectiveness against COVID-19 was still unproven.10 
• In March 2020, two engineers in Brescia, Italy, a region that was particularly 
hard-hit by the pandemic, used a desktop 3D printer to fabricate replacement 
valves for more than a hundred ventilator machines used at a local hospital.11 
Early news reports claimed that a ventilator manufacturer threatened to sue the 
engineers for infringing patents covering the valves.12 While the existence of 
the threat and the patents themselves remains murky, the incident sparked a 
flurry of commentary regarding the risks that volunteers and hospitals could 
face from patents.13 
• Later in March, patent assertion entity (PAE) Labrador Diagnostics sued French 
firm bioMérieux and its Utah-based subsidiary BioFire Diagnostics for patent 
infringement. Labrador alleged that diagnostic kits being developed for 
COVID-19 infringed patents that it had acquired from defunct blood testing 
 
 
8 Frank Tietze, Pratheeba Vimalnath, Leonidas Aristodemou, Jenny Molloy, Crisis-Critical 
Intellectual Property: Findings from the COVID-19 Pandemic, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ENGINEERING 
MANAGEMENT, Jun. 2020. 
9 Jacob Schindler, Wuhan lab says it will seek patent protection of Gilead antiviral, INTELL. ASSET 
MGT., Feb. 5, 2020. 
10 See id., Enrico Bonadio & Andrea Baldini, COVID-19, Patents and the Never-Ending Tension 
between Proprietary Rights and the Protection of Public Health, EUR. J. RISK REG. (2020). 
11 Cristian Fracassi & Alessandro Romaioli, We Made Copies of Ventilator Parts to Help Hospitals 
Fight Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2020. 
12 Jay Peters, Volunteers produce 3D-printed valves for life-saving coronavirus treatments, VERGE 
(Mar 17, 2020, updated Mar., 18 2020), 
https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/17/21184308/coronavirus-italy-medical-3d-print-valves-
treatments (one person involved recounted, “Let’s say the risk to be sued exists since they bypassed 
a patent.”) (visited Jan. 22, 2021). 
13 See Lucas Osborn, 3D Printing, Patent Infringement, and the Coronavirus, PATENTLY-O BLOG, 
Mar. 19, 2020, https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/03/printing-infringement-coronavirus.html. There 
are numerous other issues arising from unauthorized attempts to repair medical equipment, 
including ventilators. These include tight manufacturer controls on copyrighted service manuals and 
locked control software. See Jason Koebler, Hospitals Need to Repair Ventilators. Manufacturers 
Are Making That Impossible. Vice.com, Mar. 18, 2020, 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/wxekgx/hospitals-need-to-repair-ventilators-manufacturers-
are-making-that-impossible. 
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company Theranos.14 News of the lawsuit sparked a wave of negative publicity 
that quickly persuaded Labrador’s parent company, Fortress Investments, to 
end the lawsuit and offer royalty-free licenses to anyone conducting COVID-
19 testing.15 
• On April 1, Kentucky governor Andy Beshear publicly called on 3M 
Corporation to grant broad access to more than 400 patents covering “N95” 
respirators used by healthcare and other individuals at high risk of infection.16  
Beshear was responding to severe shortages of such protective equipment in his 
state, which he and others attributed to patents that prevented firms other than 
3M from manufacturing them.  He is reported to have urged 3M to license its 
patents to “the nation” as its “patriotic duty” in a time of national crisis. 
• Beginning in April, another PAE, Swirlate IP, brought patent infringement suits 
against a more than a dozen manufacturers of products including ventilators and 
blood glucose monitors.17 The asserted patent covered wireless 
communications technology and was originally owned by Panasonic.18 
• In July, Vancouver-based AbCellera Biologics sued rival Berkeley Lights for 
the infringement of eight patents originally issued to the University of British 
Columbia.19 In the suit, AbCellera sought an injunction to prevent Berkeley 
from selling its Beacon Optofluidic System, which is being used for the 
discovery and development of antibodies against COVID-19.  
• From the earliest weeks of the pandemic, patents were also perceived as 
hindering research efforts relating to COVID-19.  As one senior molecular 
biology researcher recalls: 
[F]rom the first moment we started having these [COVID-19] 
meetings there were discussions of patents. There were discussions 
of things that we couldn't do because they were patented; there were 
discussions of things where we didn't know if we could do them, if 
they were valid things that we could use to pursue strategies to deal 
 
 
14 Labrador Diagnostics LLC v. Biofire Diagnostics, LLC and Biomerieux S.A., Case No. 1:20-cv-
00348 (D. Del., filed March 9, 2020). 
15 Craig Clough, Fortress Offers IP Rights To Fight COVID-19 After Backlash, LAW360, Mar. 17, 
2020). 
16 See Editorial Team, The Netherlands Joins COVID-19 IP Pool Initiative; Kentucky Governor 
Requests 3M Release N95 Patent, HEALTHPOLICYWATCH, Apr. 8, 2020, https://healthpolicy-
watch.news/the-netherlands-joins-covid-19-ip-pool-initiative-kentucky-governor-requests-3m-
release-n95-patent/ (visited Feb. 2, 2021). 
17 See Unified Patents, Contests/Contest Swirlate IP LLC - US 7,567,622 (Wireless Communication 
Systems), https://patroll.unifiedpatents.com/contests/cKFKWRAAwqyiM2y5o (visited Jan. 22, 
2021); Elec. Frontier Fndn., New Low for a Bad Patent: Patent Troll Sues Ventilator Company, May 
20, 2020, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/05/new-low-bad-patent-patent-troll-sues-ventilator-
company (visited Feb. 2, 2021). 
18 See Unified Patents, supra note 17. 
19 AbCellera Biologics Inc. v. Berkeley Lights Inc., Case 1:20-cv-00931-RGA (D. Del., filed Jul. 9, 
2020). Four additional patents were added to the suit in August. Christopher Yasiejko, After Stock 
Surges, Covid Antibody Seeker Faces Patent Threat, BloombergLaw, Aug. 26, 2020. 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3780850





with the pandemic because of patents. And even more astonishingly 
to me, there were already discussions about patenting the things that 
were going to happen in these COVID labs.20 
• Finally, in the crucial area of vaccine research, it soon became apparent that a 
patent “gold rush” was on.  One news report in May 2020 announced “Virus 
Researchers Race to File Patents …”,21 long before any vaccine candidate was 
close to approval. Echoing concerns over the inaccessibility of patented vaccine 
technologies during the SARS and Ebola outbreaks, the WHO urged 
governments and the private sector to make patents broadly available in the 
fight against COVID-19.22  
These examples indicate that specter of patent liability and litigation manifested 
itself from the early days of the pandemic in areas ranging from basic research23 
and vaccine development to the manufacture, supply and distribution of medical 
supplies and equipment.  
The public sector reaction to these concerns these was swift and included the 
issuance by a half dozen countries of compulsory licensing orders for COVID-
related biomedical technologies24 and the formation by the WHO of a COVID-19 
 
 
20 Michael B. Eisen, Howard Hughes Medical Institute, University of California Berkeley, Oral 
Comments delivered at Lee E. Teitelbaum Utah Law Review Symposium – The Law & Ethics of 
Medical Research (Nov. 20, 2020). 
21 Matthew Bultman, Virus Researchers Race to File Patents Ahead of Research Reveal, Bloomberg 
Law News, May 15, 2020. 
22 World Health Org., Making the response to COVID-19 a public common good - Solidarity Call 
to Action, Jun. 1, 2020, https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/global-
research-on-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov/covid-19-technology-access-pool/solidarity-call-to-
action [hereinafter WHO Solidarity Call to Action]. 
23 One notable area in which patents have not played a role in the COVID-19 pandemic is  genomic 
sequencing.  The researchers that first elucidated the genomic sequence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus 
did not seek to patent it, but instead released it in the publicly-accessible GenBank data repository. 
Their release of this critical data enabled the scientific community to mobilize rapidly and conduct 
research on a range of diagnostic, vaccine and therapeutic applications based on the viral RNA 
sequence. See Michael A. Martin, David VanInsberghe, Katia Koelle, Insights from SARS-CoV-2 
sequences, 371 SCIENCE 466, 466 (2021) (“More than 260,000 [SARS-CoV-2 ] sequences are now 
available in public databases, about a year after the viral genome was first sequenced. These 
sequences and their associated metadata have allowed researchers to estimate the timing of SARS-
CoV-2 spillover into humans, characterize the spread of the virus, and gauge virus adaptation to its 
new host”), Michael J. Mina & Kristian G. Andersen, COVID-19 testing: One size does not fit all, 
371 SCIENCE 126, 126 (2021) (“Tests for detecting … SARSCoV-2 were developed within days of 
the release of the virus genome”).  Had the researchers who first sequenced SARS-CoV-2 sought 
patent protection for their discovery, as earlier research teams had during the SARS, H1N1 and 
H5N1 outbreaks (Rimmer, 2004), global research relating to COVID-19 could have been less 
efficient and more costly. One of the reasons that patents are no longer sought on genomic sequences 
is the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013), which established that a sequence of naturally-occurring nucleotides is 
an unpatentable “product of nature”. See Jorge L. Contreras, COVID-19 as an Example of Why 
Genomic Sequence Data Should Remain Patent Ineligible. 
24 See Part I.B.2, infra. 
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Technology Access Pool (C-TAP).25 Voluntary efforts also emerged to address 
perceived areas in which patents and other intellectual property could hinder the 
response to COVID-19. Ventilator manufacturers such as Medtronic and Smiths 
Group made product designs available for free over the web,26 and several large 
universities and national laboratories offered to license pandemic-relevant 
technologies on a royalty-free basis.27 
Alongside these efforts, an independent group of legal experts, scientists and 
engineers28 coalesced to develop a common framework that would enable 
intellectual property holders to commit their rights to the COVID-19 response on a 
compensation-free basis without the need for governmental intervention or the 
administrative complexities of IP pooling arrangements. This work resulted in the 
Open COVID Pledge (OCP), a standardized licensing platform for patents and 
copyrights that was launched on April 7, 2020.29 At its launch, the OCP included 
over 70,000 patents licensed by Intel, and within a few weeks Microsoft, Facebook, 
Uber, Amazon, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, Sandia National Laboratory and other 
large patent holders had joined the effort.30 To date, it is estimated that close to 
500,000 patents have been pledged under the OCP framework,31 and the OCP has 
been included as an integral “operational part” of the WHO’s C-TAP program.32 
As such, the OCP has helped to promote an open innovation landscape in key areas 
of COVID-19 research and production.33 
This article discusses the genesis and formation of the OCP, including the goals 
and design choices that shaped its development. The remainder of this article 
 
 
25 See Part I.C, infra. 
26 [Nature Bio paper] 
27 [Nature Bio paper] 
28 The group, which referred to itself as the “Open COVID Coalition” and the “OCP Steering 
Committee”, consisted of ten individuals: Jorge Contreras, Michael Eisen, Ariel Ganz, Mark 
Lemley, Jenny Molloy, Diane Peters, Alexander James Phillips, Mark Radcliffe, Eric Steuer and 
Frank Tietze. 
29 See Eric Steuer, Patent holders urged to take “Open COVID Pledge” for quicker end to pandemic, 
OpenCOVIDPledge, Apr. 7, 2020, https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/04/07/patent-holders-urged-
to-take-open-covid-pledge-for-quicker-end-to-pandemic-2/. 
30 See Eric Steuer, Amazon, Facebook, Hewlett Packard Enterprise, IBM, Microsoft, and Sandia 
National Laboratories join “Open COVID Pledge” to make patents freely available in the fight 
against COVID-19, Apr. 20, 2020, https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/04/20/amazon-facebook-
hewlett-packard-enterprise-ibm-microsoft-and-sandia-national-laboratories-join-open-covid-
pledge-to-make-patents-freely-available-in-the-fight-against-covid-19-2/ 
31 Estimating the number of patents held by different entities is an inexact art, and is confounded by 
reporting (both by patent holders and third parties) that is inaccurate, outdated and inconsistent.  
Compounding these problems are differing standards for how patents, patent applications, patent 
families, and international filings are treated.  Based on available public records and reports, OCP 
estimates that between 417,000 and 500,000 worldwide patents have been pledged to date. 
32 See Part x, infra. 
33 See Anita M. McGahan et al., Tackling Societal Challenges with Open Innovation, 63 CALIF. 
MANAGE. REV. 49, 55 (2021) ("it was not until the COVID-19 pandemic swept the world that we 
saw how a sense of urgency can truly fuel open innovation. Through initiatives like the Open Covid 
Pledge firms started to offer free licenses to their IP for the purpose of fighting the pandemic"). See 
also Part IV.C, infra. 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3780850





proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief summary of patent law and the 
economic incentives that patents provide for innovation and product development, 
then explores how patents may serve to limit access to necessary products and 
services during times of crisis. Part II discusses conventional mechanisms used to 
expand access to biomedical technologies, including public sector approaches such 
as compulsory licensing, march-in rights and government use, and private 
approaches such as patent pools and clearinghouses.  Part III then shifts to the open 
licensing models that informed the development of the OCP, including open source 
software and Creative Commons licensing, and concludes with a discussion of 
other pledges that have been made in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Part IV 
discusses the design and organization of the OCP, which combines features of open 
source and Creative Commons licensing with IP pledges. Part V describes the 
implementation and adoption of the OCP, including an assessment of its impact in 
different industry sectors.  Part VI analyzes the OCP in the broader context of patent 
pledges, describing its future prospects and considers other contexts in which IP-
sharing platforms such the OCP may be useful. 
 
I.  PATENTS, ACCESS AND BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION 
 
A. The Access versus Innovation Debate 
A patent confers on its owner a twenty-year period during which the owner has 
the exclusive right to make, use, sell and import the patented invention.34 This grant 
of exclusivity gives the patent owner the ability to exploit the market for the 
patented invention to the exclusion of others during the patent term, and thus to 
charge prices for that invention that are not constrained by market competition.  At 
a basic level, patents thus afford two principal and related benefits to their owners:  
the ability to operate within a particular market without competition, and the ability 
to charge supra-competitive prices.35 
Given these factors, two competing sets of goals influence policy discussions 
relating to the patent system: allocation and innovation. Allocative considerations 
relate to the distribution of existing resources among potential users. In terms of 
many patented technologies – e.g., smart phones, aircraft engines, food additives – 
market forces act efficiently to allocate products to those who value them most 
highly.36 However, in some cases, simple market forces may not work to achieve 
 
 
34 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271. The focus of this article is on U.S. law.  However, the basic protections 
of patent law are common to most countries. 
35 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD W. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW (2003). Of course, many patents cover only minor technical improvements to 
existing technologies or small components of large, complex products that may be covered by 
thousands of separate patents.  In these cases, the patent holder is not likely to enjoy a monopoly, or 
even market power, in any given product market. See Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, 
Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). Nevertheless, this simplified economic model best illustrates the 
competing concerns raised by patents. 
36 Landes & Posner, supra note 35.  
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maximum social benefit. Thus, in the case of patented drugs and healthcare 
equipment, a manufacturer’s optimal price may be unaffordable to segments of the 
population.37  
Moreover, even if the holder of a patent is willing to price a healthcare product 
at a level that will ensure broad access, it may lack the production capacity to meet 
the demand for that product. It may thus be necessary to allow others to operate 
under that patent in order to supply sufficient quantities of the product in question. 
In the event that a patent holder is unwilling to grant its existing and potential 
competitors adequate rights to operate under its patents, a research or supply 
“bottleneck” may arise.38 Because these allocative issues concern the supply of 
patented technologies at a particular time (e.g., when the need for them arises), they 
are sometimes referred to as “static” considerations.  Static allocative issues have 
been at the forefront over the debate over COVID-19 and innovation policy.39 
In contrast, “dynamic” considerations concern the market conditions that are 
needed to ensure the creation of an optimal quantity of new technologies over time. 
Patents give their owners exclusive rights to exploit their inventions commercially, 
and thus provide financial incentives to those who make commercially valuable 
discoveries and inventions.40   
Thus, some argue that increasing the availability and enforceability of patents 
is likely to increase overall innovation and the quantity of socially beneficial 
technologies that are available, particularly in response to a public emergency.41 
Such arguments have been made in varying forms in the context of the COVID-19 
pandemic. For example, the Director General of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) has argued that instead of lowering IP barriers to access to 
 
 
37 Will Zerhouni, Gary J. Nabel & Elias Zerhouni, Editorial - Patents, economics, and pandemics, 
386 SCIENCE 1035, 1035 (2020) (“Patents give a time-limited exclusivity to the innovator who can 
then set premium pricing that maximizes the return on R&D investment. Such pricing can hinder 
wide dissemination once vaccines or therapies are developed, often leaving many patients unable to 
afford these products.”) 
38 See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras & Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR, surrogate licensing, and scientific 
discovery, 355 SCIENCE 698 (2017) (discussing the risk of research bottlenecks when broad patent 
rights are held by entities that are unable to exploit all of those rights themselves and do not wish to 
license others). 
39 See Bhaven N. Sampat & Kenneth C. Shalden, The COVID-19 Innovation System, 40 HEALTH 
AFF. (MILLWOOD) 1, 5 (2021) (Perhaps an even harder policy challenge than generating the 
innovations will be scaling up production to manufacture the volumes of doses that the world 
needs.")  
40 Because their payoff is entirely market-driven, patents incentivize innovations that are likely to 
be the most lucrative, rather than the most beneficial (hence the tendency of some firms to focus 
R&D dollars on hair loss treatments and weight loss pills rather than the eradication of rare diseases). 
As a result, patents are not always optimally calibrated to address social needs. 
41 See Andrew W. Torrance, Patents to the Rescue – Disasters and Patent Law, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH 
L. 309 (2007) (arguing that patents are well-situated to incentivize the creation of lifesaving 
technologies). 
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biomedical technologies, “governments should instead be pursuing policies to 
incentivize scientific innovation through strong IP rights.”42  
In the U.S., commentators have used the pandemic as a vehicle for airing 
longstanding grievances about the Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence, blaming 
its 2012 decision in Mayo v. Prometheus,43 which held that diagnostic tests based 
on the observation of naturally-occurring physiological reactions are not eligible 
for patent protection, for the shortage of reliable COVID-19 diagnostic tests.44  And 
in an effort to accelerate the issuance of patents relating to COVID-19, the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) introduced a prioritized examination 
program.45 The PTO also created the Patents 4 Partnerships IP Marketplace 
Platform – an online resource showcasing COVID-19 related patents available for 
commercial licensing.46 
Yet a broad range of economic incentive structures other than patents exists to 
incentivize socially-beneficial innovation. These include government grants, 
subsidies, prizes, and tax incentives.47 In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
perhaps the most significant financial incentive of all may be governmental 
procurement,48 under which the United States government alone has allocated tens 
of billions of dollars to purchase vaccines, protective equipment and other 
technologies.49 While incentives like these reward desired innovation, they do not 
achieve it through grants of market exclusivity. 
 
 
42 Steve Brachmann, WHO’s C-TAP Initiative Pushes for Non-Exclusive Global Licensing Amid 
Pharma Industry Concerns, IPWatchdog, May 31, 2020 (citing Francis Gurry, Director General of 
WIPO)). 
43 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
44 See Valerie Bauman, Covid-19 Spotlights Ruling’s Chilling Effect on Diagnostic Tests, 
BLOOMBERG LAW NEWS, Mar, 23, 2020 (quoting several attorneys in private practice). See also 
Editorial, In the fight against the coronavirus outbreak, life sciences companies need certainty in 
101, IAM BLOG, Mar. 23, 2020, https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/they-focus-fighting-the-
coronavirus-outbreak-now-more-ever-life-sciences-companies (“The COVID-19 R&D surge 
seeking the rapid discovery and commercialisation of diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccines and cures 
for the present threat will lay the groundwork for a remarkable range of scientific knowledge and 
potential commercial and clinical applications. The extent to which these promising prospects turn 
into new products, new businesses and new jobs depends in significant part on restored certainty 
and breadth of the patentable subject matter”). 
45 U.S. Patent & Trademark Off., COVID-19 Prioritized Examination Pilot Program, 
https://www.uspto.gov/initiatives/covid-19-prioritized-examination-pilot (visited Jan. 25, 2021).  
46 U.S. Patent & Trademark Off., Patents 4 Partnerships IP Marketplace Platform, 
https://developer.uspto.gov/ipmarketplace/search/patents (visited Jan. 25, 2021). 
47 See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 YALE LAW J. 
544 (2019); Douglas Lichtman, The Central Assumptions of Patent Law: A Response to Ana Santos 
Rutschman’s IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 65 UNIV. CALIF. LOS ANGEL. LAW REV. 
1268–1275 (2018); Q. Claire Xue & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy and the Market 
for Vaccines, 7 J. L. BIOSCIENCES 1 (2020). 
48 See Sampat & Shalden, supra note 39, at 4 (describing governmental procurement funding in the 
U.S. and elsewhere). 
49 See Peterson Fndn., Here’s Everything The Federal Government Has Done To Respond To The 
Coronavirus So Far, Jan. 25, 2021, https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2021/01/heres-everything-congress-
has-done-to-respond-to-the-coronavirus-so-far (reporting budget allocations of “$29 billion 
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The “access versus incentives” tradeoff is one of the fundamental tensions in 
intellectual property law today.50 It is often unclear whether dynamic or static issues 
should take priority in any given situation, and advocates often promote one over 
the other depending on their own preferences (e.g., access to technology or 
obtaining patents). Policy makers have adopted a range of strategies to strike the 
right balance between expanding access to protected technological products while 
continuing to incentivize future innovation. In this respect, the COVID-19 
pandemic resembles earlier public crises in which debates over access versus 
incentives have played out.51  
Finally, it is worth remembering that removing patent barriers to the production 
of a pharmaceutical product or device will not ensure that it is supplied in 
significant quantity or at an acceptable level of quality. Many vaccines, diagnostics, 
drugs and medical devices are regulated by governmental agencies such as the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Thus, notwithstanding patent 
authorizations, a secondary supplier of a regulated drug or device will often be 
required to obtain regulatory approval of the product that it wishes to produce, as 
well as its own manufacturing facilities and processes.52  
The next Part reviews a number of potential public and private interventions 
that have been proposed and implemented to increase access to patents covering 
critical technologies in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
B. Expanding Access To Patents: Governmental Interventions 
This Part B reviews both public and private mechanisms that have been 
proposed both within the U.S. and internationally to expand access to patented 
technologies in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. These mechanisms are 
 
 
designated for the procurement and distribution of coronavirus vaccines and treatments and $22 
billion for testing, tracing, and mitigation of coronavirus”) (visited Jan. 26, 2021). 
50 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 35; Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing 
Access and Innovation in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POLICY LAW 
ETHICS 193 (2013).; Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 47. 
51 See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers, Pledging Patents for the 
Public Good: Rise and Fall of the Eco-Patent Commons, 57 HOUS. L. REV. 61, 64 (2019) (“In the 
area of climate change mitigation … a variety of proposals to increase innovation and diffusion of 
technology have been made, many of them involving adjustments to the patent system. Such 
proposals have encompassed strategies to increase the number of green/clean tech patents to 
encourage private sector investment in innovation and to decrease either the number or potency of 
such patents in an effort to reduce the costs of innovation globally” (emphasis in original)); Jesse L. 
Reynolds, Jorge L. Contreras & Joshua D. Sarnoff, Solar Climate Engineering and Intellectual 
Property: Toward a Research Commons, 18 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 71-72 (2017) (describing 
PTO initiatives both to limit and accelerate patent grants, particularly in the area of green 
technology). 
52 See Hannah Brennan, Amy Kapczynski, Christine H. Monahan & Zain Rizvi, A Prescription for 
Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 275, 
340-45 (2016) (describing NDA, ANDA and 505(b)(2) routes for regulatory approval of generic 
drugs). 
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then compared with patent pledges, and the Open COVID Pledge specifically, in 
Parts II and III. 
  
1. Compulsory Licensing 
In an effort to ensure that diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics and medical 
equipment necessary to respond to COVID-19 are developed, manufactured and 
made available rapidly and in large quantities, governments around the world have 
explored and enacted compulsory licensing measures for privately held patents. 
Generally speaking, when a government orders compulsory licensing, the holder of 
a patent is required to license it (usually at a reasonable rate) to other manufacturers 
in order to ensure the continuity of, or an increase in, production and supply of the 
patented article.53 
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the global dialogue around compulsory patent 
licensing had focused largely on making essential medicines available in the 
developing world, and most cases in which compulsory licenses were ordered in 
countries such as Brazil, India and Thailand involved drugs targeting HIV/AIDS 
and cancer.54 But the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic reignited the debate 
over compulsory licensing around the world. Early in the pandemic, compulsory 
licensing measures relating to patented technologies relevant to COVID-19 were 
authorized in countries including Chile, Ecuador, Israel, Germany and Canada.55 
Unlike many countries, the United States lacks a general statutory framework 
for compulsory patent licensing. Thus, in the U.S., the discussion around 
compulsory licensing has centered on two statutory mechanisms: federal march-in 




53 Compulsory licensing of patents is permitted under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, and compulsory 
licensing for exports of essential medicines was expressly addressed by the WTO’s Doha 
Declaration and subsequent amendments to the TRIPS Agreement. See Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Art. 31; World Trade Organization, Ministerial 
Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 6, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2001); and World 
Trade Organization, General Council Decision: Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health, WT/L/540 and Corr. 1 (Sept. 1, 2003). 
54 See John R. Thomas, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Inventions, Congressional Research 
Service Report at 9-13 (Oct. 30, 2013) (cataloging and summarizing non-U.S. compulsory licenses);  
Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory licensing of patented pharmaceutical inventions: evaluating the 
options, 37 J. L. MED. ETHICS 247 (2009). 
55 See Ellen 't Hoen, Covid-19 and the comeback of compulsory licensing, MEDICINES L. & POL, 
Mar. 23, 2020, Adam Houldsworth, The key covid-19 compulsory licensing developments so far, 
INTELL. ASSET. MGT., Apr. 7, 2020. 
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2. March-In Rights under the Bayh-Dole Act 
The Bayh-Dole Act of 198056 was intended to rationalize the previously chaotic 
rules governing the ownership of federally-funded inventions. Most importantly, it 
allowed research institutions to patent inventions arising from government-funded 
research and penalized institutions that failed to pursue patent protection for such 
inventions.57 In return, the Act gives the federal government a non-exclusive, paid-
up license under each patent covering a federally-funded invention,58 and 
authorizes the government to exercise so-called ‘march in’ rights to compel the 
owner to license it to one or more third parties to the extent necessary, among other 
things, to address health or safety needs.59 
Over the years, numerous petitions have been filed requesting that federal 
agencies exercise their march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act, primarily in cases 
involving under-supplied or costly pharmaceutical products.60 To date, however, 
neither NIH nor any other federal agency has exercised its march-in rights during 
the 40+ years that the Bayh-Dole Act has been in effect.61 Moreover, march-in 
rights apply only to inventions that were made using federal funding.62 While the 
foundational discoveries underlying many new drug candidates were made by 
federally-funded university laboratories, a significant amount of biomedical 
research is conducted by pharmaceutical and medical device companies without 
federal support. As a result, march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act have been of 
little practical relevance during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
3. Governmental Use and § 1498 
The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which traces its origins to the 1910 
Government Use Statute,63 is not a compulsory licensing law, but a limited waiver 
by the U.S. government of its immunity to suit in the federal courts.64 Under this 
statute, if the federal government (itself or through its contractors) uses or 
manufactures an invention patented in the United States without permission of the 
owner, the owner is granted a remedy – the pursuit of a claim for “reasonable and 
 
 
56 35 U.S.C. § 200 et seq. 
57 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(3). 
58 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4); 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(c)(3).  
59 35 U.S.C. § 203(a); 37 C.F.R. §§ 401.6, 401.14(j). 
60 See John R. Thomas, March-In Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act, Congressional Research Service 
Report 7-5700 (Aug. 22, 2016) (cataloging and summarizing march-in petitions). 
61 See Thomas, supra note 60. 
62 35 U.S.C. § 201(e). 
63 An Act to Provide Additional Protection for Owners of Patents of the United States, and for Other 
Purposes, Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851. For a historical overview, see Sean M. 
O’Connor, Taking, Tort, Or Crown Right?: The Confused Early History Of Government Patent 
Policy, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 183-84 (2012) and Gerald J. Mossinghoff & 
Robert F. Allnutt, Patent Infringement in Government Procurement: A Remedy Without a Right, 42 
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 5, 6-9 (1966). 
64 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). 
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entire compensation” in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.65 No other remedy is 
permitted, and the patent owner cannot seek to enjoin the government’s use of the 
invention.  
Since its enactment, § 1498 has been invoked periodically in cases relating to 
the procurement of military technology and other equipment.66 Though less 
frequently, § 1498 has also been used to bolster the U.S. supply of drugs and 
biomedical technologies at prices lower than those charged by patent holders. 
Milton Silverman and Philip Randolph Lee report that during the 1960s, the 
Department of Defense's Military Medical Supply Agency (MMSA) utilized § 1498 
to obtain supplies of approximately fifty drugs, including the antibiotic tetracycline, 
from producers in countries where the drugs were not patented.67 Though the 
federal government’s use of § 1498 in the pharmaceutical sector declined by the 
1970s,68 the Department of Health and Human Services threatened to invoke the 
statute again in 2001 during the post-9/11 anthrax scare.69 Since then, 
commentators have proposed using the government’s powers under § 1498 to drive 
down drug prices,70 but no meaningful utilization of this power has occurred for 
pharmaceutical products in nearly two decades.  
With the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, and highly-publicized shortages 
of testing kits, respirators, ventilators and other critical supplies,71 the prospect of 
U.S. government intervention through § 1498 again gained traction.72 Nevertheless, 
for what appears to be a range of political and practical reasons, there has been little 
meaningful movement in the United States toward the exercise of government use 
rights.  It is possible that opposition from the private sector is partially responsible. 
Moreover, any such intervention might contradict the stance that the United States 




66 See, e,g., Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (patents on night 
vision goggles). 
67 MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILIP RANDOLPH LEE, PILLS, PROFITS, AND POLITICS 187 (1974). 
68 Brennan, et al., supra note 52, at 306. 
69 See id. at 303 (the government’s proposal to import doses of low-cost generic ciprofloxacin caused 
the domestic manufacturer Bayer to reduce its price by half). 
70 See id. at 279-80 and Amy Kapczynski & Aaron S. Kesselheim, ‘Government Patent Use’: A 
Legal Approach To Reducing Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFFAIRS 791 (2016). 
71 See Peter Baker and Eileen Sullivan, U.S. Virus Plan Anticipates 18-Month Pandemic and 
Widespread Shortages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-plan.html (White House plan 
predicts “potentially critical shortages of diagnostics, medical supplies (including [personal 
protective equipment] and pharmaceuticals), and staffing in some locations.”) 
72 See, e.g., Adam Houldsworth, Covid-19 emergency may expose compulsory licensing limits, IAM 
blog, Mar. 24, 2020, https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/covid-19-emergency-may-expose-
compulsory-licensing-limits; Valerie Bauman, Government May Have Ownership or Rights to 
Coronavirus Vaccines, BLOOMBERG LAW NEWS, Mar. 20, 2020, 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-sciences/government-may-have-ownership-or-
rights-to-coronavirus-vaccines.  
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issuance of compulsory patent licenses by developing countries.73 Interestingly, the 
most significant result of possible government intervention in this area may have 
been the voluntary pledges made by IP holders seeking to forestall more drastic 
governmental action.74 
 
C. Private Ordering: Patent Pools 
In addition to governmentally-driven mechanisms for making patented 
technologies broadly available, private ordering and market forces sometimes work 
to achieve the same ends. One of the principal private means for clearing blocking 
patent positions and enabling industry cooperation is the patent pool. 
 
1. Patent Pools in the Life Sciences 
Patent pools are private arrangements among patent holders that enable the 
participants to operate under one another’s patents, to manage and administer the 
pooled patents through a centralized mechanism, and often to grant licenses of the 
pooled patents to third parties, with the proceeds allocated among the participants 
according to an agreed formula. Patent pools have been around for more than a 
century in industries ranging from oil refinement to aircraft to semiconductors to 
digital media.  In all of these cases, pools have enabled the efficient consolidation 
of patents in a manner that has facilitated licensing and commercialization. 
Historically, however, patent pools have not enjoyed much commercial success 
in the biomedical sector. As I have previously explained, 
Several factors could explain the absence of pooling in this arena: 
the need for at least some market exclusivity in an environment with 
extremely high costs of product development, clinical trials and 
regulatory approval; patent holders’ desire to retain control over 
their assets; and concern over compromising commercial secrecy by 
collaborating with others.75 
Patent pools have also been suggested as mechanisms to address more acute 
public health crises such as disease outbreaks. Patent pooling structures were 
actively discussed and considered in response to the SARS outbreak of 2002-03,76 
 
 
73 See Sapna Kumar, Compulsory Licensing Of Patents During Pandemics (working paper Jan. 28, 
2021). 
74 See Part II.C, infra.  See also Thomas Prock, et al., 3D printing and IP in a pandemic, INTELL. 
ASSET MGT., Apr. 3, 2020 (“it would be advantageous for IP rights holders to be proactive by 
licensing IP on their own terms before the decision is made for them by the government.”) 
75 Jorge L. Contreras, The Anticommons at Twenty: Concerns for Research Continue, 361 SCIENCE 
335 (2018). 
76 See, e.g., James H.M. Simon, Eric Claassen, Carmen E. Correa, & Albert D.M.E. Osterhausu, 
Managing severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) intellectual property rights: the possible role 
of patent pooling, 83 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 717 (2005); Carmen E. Correa, Case 2. The SARS 
case: IP fragmentation and patent pools in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING 
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the H5N1 influenza outbreak of 2005,77 and the H1N1 influenza pandemic of 
2009.78 Yet despite the perceived need for aggregation of distributed patent rights 
in order to combat these diseases, patent pools were never formed for a range of 
practical, administrative and competitive reasons.79  
In the wake of these outbreaks, the WHO initiated a series of activities to 
explore the viability of pooling patents relating to public health technologies.80 
Specifically, the WHO’s 2011 Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property (GSPOA) called for an examination of the 
“feasibility of establishing voluntary patent pools of upstream and downstream 
technologies to promote innovation of and access to health products and medical 
devices.”81 Yet despite support within WHO,82 no significant progress toward such 
pools occurred. 
One reason that patent pools may not have successfully formed in these areas 
may relate to antitrust law. A patent pool necessarily includes a variety of patents 
held by different owners. But when a pool aggregates rights covering technologies 
that may be substitutes for one another, such as patents covering different types of 
vaccines, innovation could be reduced (i.e., why try to develop an improved vaccine 
when all vaccines are licensed under the pool?). On the other hand, when pooled 
patents are complementary (e.g., several patents covering aspects of the same 
vaccine), pools are viewed as increasing efficiency and enhancing innovation. It is 
for this reason that most antitrust enforcement agencies concur that the patents 
included in a pool should generally be complementary and not substitutes for one 
another.83 
Yet the exercise of determining which patents are complementary and which 
patents are substitutes is not a trivial one.  Various studies have estimated the cost 
of this “essentiality analysis” to be in the range of US$10,000 per patent,84 a cost 
 
 
MODELS: PATENT POOLS, CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES 42 
(Geertrui van Overwalle, ed., 2009); Hillary Greene, Patent Pooling Behind The Veil Of 
Uncertainty: Antitrust, Competition Policy, And The Vaccine Industry, 90 BU L. REV. 1397 (2010). 
77 See Dana Beldiman, Patent Choke Points in the Influenza-Related Medicines Industry: Can 
Patent Pools Provide Balanced Access? 15 TULANE J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 31 (2012). 
78 See Greene, supra note 76. 
79 See, e.g., Beldiman, supra note 77, at 58 (“Because it took an extended period of time to agree 
which patents to include, to craft the pool structure agreement and its licensing terms, and to ensure 
that antitrust and other regulations were met, the SARS outbreak was contained before the pool was 
ever completed.”) 
80 World Health Org., Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and 
Intellectual Property (2011). 
81 Id. at 13. 
82 See World Health Org., Research and Development to Meet Health Needs in Developing 
Countries: Strengthening Global Financing and Coordination. Report of the Consultative Expert 
Working Group on Research and Development: Financing and Coordination (2012). 
83 U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE & U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (2007). 
84 Jorge L. Contreras, Essentiality and Standards-Essential Patents in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 209 (Jorge L. 
Contreras ed., 2017). 
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that can easily reach millions of dollars in heavily-patented areas. Patent pools 
involve other costs, as well.  Professors Robert Merges and Michael Mattioli have 
estimated the set-up costs of two major patent pools relating to data compression 
standards -- MPEG Audio and HVEC – at US $7.8 million and $4.8 million, 
respectively, with annual operating budgets in the range of $600,000 and $2 
million.85 
 
2. IP Clearinghouses and the Medicines Patent Pool 
In addition to formal pooling arrangements, some have sought to address public 
health needs through more flexible structures.  For example, in 2010 the Unitaid 
arm of the WHO created the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP).86  MPP’s mission is to 
aggregate patents, clinical trials data and other IP relating to HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Hepatitis-C medications and make them available at low or no 
cost to manufacturers that commit to produce and sell drugs to users in low-income 
countries.87  
Despite its name, the MPP is not a patent pool, as that term is commonly 
understood. Rather, it is a clearinghouse or intermediary that obtains inbound 
licenses from willing IP holders and then sublicenses those rights to generic drug 
manufacturers operating in developing countries.  These licenses, which may be 
royalty-bearing or royalty-free, are generally available on an a-la-carte basis, and 
do not necessarily aggregate all of the rights licensed to MPP (thus avoiding some 
of the antitrust issues and up-front costs described above). To date, several 
significant patent holders, including AbbVie, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Gilead 
Sciences, Pfizer, ViiV Healthcare and Johns Hopkins University, have licensed IP 
to the MPP, which has in turn granted twenty-two sublicenses to generic drug 
manufacturers for distribution of products in the developing world.88 A similar 
effort that gained attention around the same time was the Pool for Open Innovation 
Against Neglected Tropical Diseases (POINT), which has since been folded into 




85 Robert P. Merges & Michael Mattioli, Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Patent Pools, 78 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 281, 307, 310-12 (2017). 
86 See Medicines Patent Pool, About the Medicines Patent Pool, http://medicinespatentpool.org. 
87 See id. See also Esteban Burrone, Patent Pooling in Public Health in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK 
OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GOVERNANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 93, 96-102 (Margaret Chon, Pedro Roffe & Ahmed Abdel-Latif, eds. 2019). 
88 Medicines Patent Pool, Products Licensed, https://medicinespatentpool.org/what-we-do/global-
licence-overview/licences-in-the-mpp/?patent_holder=2718 (visited Mar. 27, 2020). 
89 See Jennifer Dent, Katy M. Graef & Paddy Shivanand, Open innovation to bolster research and 
development for neglected and emerging infectious diseases, 1 J. MEDICINES DEVELOPMENT SCI., 
46 (2015); Hannah Waters, Patent-sharing scheme for neglected diseases may have catch, 17 
NATURE MED. 1529 (2011). 
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3. The WHO COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) 
In the early days of the pandemic, advocates proposed that a patent pool or 
MPP-like clearinghouse be formed to aggregate technologies responsive to the 
COVID-19 pandemic.90 In March 2020, the President and Health Minister of Costa 
Rica requested that the WHO “undertake an effort to pool rights to technologies 
that are useful for the detection, prevention, control and treatment of the COVID-
19 pandemic.”91  
On May 29, the WHO announced the creation of the COVID-19 Technology 
Access Pool (C-TAP),92 a program “intended to provide a means to accelerate the 
development of products needed to fight COVID-19 as well as to accelerate the 
scale-up of manufacturing and the removal of barriers to access in order to make 
products available globally.”93 Supported by thirty countries, C-TAP adopts a five-
pronged approach to expanding technology access and dissemination in response 
to COVID-19:94 
• Public disclosure of gene sequences and data; 
• Transparency around the publication of all clinical trial results; 
• Inclusion in research funding agreements of requirements for equitable 
distribution, affordability and the publication of trial data; 
• Licensing any potential treatment, diagnostic, vaccine or other health 
technology to the Medicines Patent Pool; and 
• Promotion of open innovation models and technology transfer that 
increase local manufacturing and supply capacity, including through the 
Open COVID Pledge and the WHO’s Technology Access Partnership 
(TAP). 
As indicated by the fourth and fifth points above, C-TAP relies on existing IP 
aggregation and licensing platforms – the MPP, the OCP and the TAP -- rather than 
attempting to create a new one. The fact that the OCP was included in this 
multinational UN-backed initiative less than two months after its launch is a 
testament to its efficient design and broad, rapid adoption in the field. 
 
 
90 Brook K. Baker, Rationale for Supporting Costa Rica’s Proposal for Emergency COVID-19 
Technology IP Pool for All Countries (Mar. 2020), https://healthgap.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/Rationale-for-Emergency-Technology-IP-Pool-for-COVID19.pdf. 
91 Letter dated March 23, 2020, from Carlos Alvarado Quesada, President of the Republic [of Costa 
Rica], and Daniel Salas Peraza, Minister of Health, to Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-
General, World Health Organization [hereinafter Costa Rica Letter]. 
92 WHO Solidarity Call to Action, supra note 22. 
93 World Health Org., Operationalising The COVID 19 Technology Access Pool (C Tap) - A 
Concept Paper, Oct. 27, 2020, https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/c-tap-a-concept-paper 
[hereinafter C-TAP Concept Paper]. 
94 See World Health Org., WHO and Costa Rica launch landmark COVID-19 Technology Access 
Pool, May 29, 2020, https://www.who.int/news/item/29-05-2020-international-community-rallies-
to-support-open-research-and-science-to-fight-covid-19 (visited Feb. 2, 2021). 
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II.  OPEN LICENSING MODELS 
 
The Open COVID Pledge offers a structural alternative to governmental 
compulsory licensing mechanisms, on one hand, and administratively complex 
patent pools, on the other hand.  Its design borrows from a number of existing 
licensing models that are known for their efficiency and broad adoption, including 
the public licenses utilized by the open source software community and the 
lightweight licensing framework developed by Creative Commons for online 
content. It also adopts the features of prior patent pledges made in a range of 
industries and those made early in the COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
A. Open Source Software 
A computer program’s “source” code is a version of the program written in a 
human-readable programming language such as C++, PERL, BASIC or Fortran.  In 
order to execute on a computer, this source code is typically compiled or interpreted 
into machine-readable “object” code, which is unintelligible to most people. Most 
proprietary software is licensed and distributed in object code form.   
Beginning in the 1970s, a group of software developers in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, bristling against the restrictive practices of corporate software 
firms, began to make their source code publicly available.95 This trend began the 
“free software” or “open source software” (OSS) movement. Despite its emphasis 
on sharing and open development structures, OSS software today has been 
embraced by the business community and includes some of the most successful and 
widely-deployed software in the world, including the Linux and Android operating 
systems, the Firefox web browser and the Apache web server.96 
 
1. OSS Licensing 
The hallmark of OSS software is that its source code is made available to the 
public, usually without charge. While its developers generally retain their 
copyrights (and patents) in the software code,97 they indiscriminately grant licenses 
to anyone who wishes to use, modify or distribute that code.98 These licenses are 
typically granted via self-executing, publicly-accessible agreements that become 
effective as soon as the user downloads or uses the software, much like consumer 
shrinkwrap or clickwrap agreements.99  
 
 
95 See Richard Stallman, The GNU Operating System and The Free Software Movement in OPEN 
SOURCES : VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION (1999). 
96 See, generally, YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006). 
97 OSS is not contributed to the “public domain”.  See Stallman, supra note 95. 
98 cite 
99 cite 
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The first OSS licenses were created by the GNU Project, a software 
development effort led by Richard Stallman, one of the founders of the OSS 
movement.  One of the best known and most widely-deployed OSS licenses is the 
GNU General Public License or GPL, which now has numerous variants.  But, as 
discussed below, the GPL is complex and contains a number of features that are 
unattractive to commercial users.  As a result, a number of alternative OSS licenses 
have emerged over the years.  Among the most popular of these are the BSD license 
developed at the University of California Berkeley in 1990,100 the MIT License, the 
Mozilla Public License and the Apache Public License.101  
Given the proliferation of licensing structures purporting to be OSS, in 1998 
the non-profit Open Source Initiative (OSI) published a set of criteria defining what 
it meant to be an “open source” license”.102 These criteria include: 
1. Free redistribution of the software must be permitted; 
2.  Source code must be made available to users; 
3.  Users must be permitted to create modifications and 
derivative works of the software; 
4.  The license may not discriminate against persons, groups or 
fields of endeavor and cannot be specific to a particular product or 
technology; 
5.  The license must automatically apply to anyone to whom the 
software is redistributed without the need for an additional license. 
In addition to publishing and occasionally updating these criteria, OSI certifies 
the compliance of particular licensing agreements with its criteria.  As of December 
2020, it had certified 105 such licenses as meeting its definition of OSS.103 
 
2. Other Terms of OSS Licenses 
While all OSS licenses include the basic provisions identified in the OSI 
definition, many include additional terms and conditions, some of which have 
become controversial.  Among these are the following: 
 
a. Attribution.   
Most OSS licenses require that distributors of OSS software reproduce any 
copyright notices that are included in the original source code. When a user 
modifies a portion of that code, it adds itself to the copyright notice, thereby 
 
 
100 See JORGE L. CONTRERAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING AND TRANSACTIONS: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 543-44 (0.9 ed. 2021)(discussing BSD licenses). 
101 OSI, Open Source Licenses by Category, https://opensource.org/licenses/category (visited Jan. 
24, 2021). 
102 OSI, https://opensource.org/osd.html 
103 https://opensource.org/licenses/alphabetical 
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creating a list of all contributors to the code like an old fashioned “chain letter”.  In 
this way, contributors to the copyrighted code receive attribution or recognition for 
their original contributions, an important feature of the OSS ethos.104 
 
b. Copyleft 
Richard Stallman coined the term “copyleft” (the opposite of copyright) to 
describe the licensing strategy of the GPL: 
Copyleft uses copyright law, but flips it over to serve the opposite 
of its usual purpose: instead of a means of privatizing software, it 
becomes a means of keeping software free. 
The central idea of copyleft is that we give everyone permission to 
run the program, copy the program, modify the program, and 
distribute modified versions--but not permission to add restrictions 
of their own. Thus, the crucial freedoms that define "free software" 
are guaranteed to everyone who has a copy; they become inalienable 
rights. 
 
c.  “Viral” Nature 
If a piece of software is distributed under the GPL, then anyone who 
redistributes that software, or any modified version of that software, must also 
distribute it under the GPL.  Thus, like a biological virus, the GPL propagates itself 
from user to user, program to program.  But the real threat perceived by the GPL 
was not the continuing need to license GPL’d code under the GPL, but the risk that 
the GPL’d code could infect proprietary code with which it was combined, making 
the entire combined work subject to the GPL.105 
 
d. Patents and OSS 
Though most OSS licenses deal primarily with copyrights in computer code, 
some address patent issues as well. For example, the GPL and Mozilla licenses 
require that a contributor to an OSS program license to users its patents covering 
every component of that program, even those contributed by others.106 Other OSS 
licenses, such as the Apache license, require a contributor to grant licenses under 
 
 
104 See Benkler, supra note 96. 
105 See CONTRERAS, LICENSING, supra note 100, at 546-47 (discussing “viral” nature of GPL and 
perceived threat to commercial software). 
106 See General Public License, v3, Section 11, ¶ 2 (each contributor grants to each user of the 
program “a non-exclusive, worldwide, royalty-free patent license under the contributor's essential 
patent claims, to make, use, sell, offer for sale, import and otherwise run, modify and propagate the 
contents of its contributor version”). See also CONTRERAS, LICENSING, supra note 100, at 548 
(discussing concerns over breadth of GPL and Mozilla patent licenses). 
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its patents, but only with respect to its own contributions to the OSS program, and 
not those of third parties.107 
 
B. Creative Commons Licensing 
Creative Commons began in 2004 as an experiment by law professors Larry 
Lessig, James Boyle and others.108 Its goal was to create a legal framework that 
would enable individual producers of online content – photographs, videos, poetry, 
blog posts – to relinquish some of the exclusive rights granted by copyright law and 
allow others to copy, disseminate and modify their work.  The system utilized a 
simple set of “tags”, each of which specified a particular right being granted to 
others. 
Thus, if a photographer wishes to post a photo to a social media site and make 
it available for anyone else to use for any purpose so long as they give her credit 
(attribution), she can tag the photo with the “CC BY” symbol, and the CC 
Attribution license will apply.109  If she also wishes to stipulate that her photo 
cannot be modified in any way, then she can tag it with the “CC BY ND” 
(Attribution, No Derivatives) license.   If she wants to be sure that her photo remains 
free for all to use, even if someone incorporates it into a proprietary database or 
web site, then she can add the “SA” (Share Alike) tag.110  And if she wishes to 
prohibit commercial uses (e.g., using her photo in a corporate ad), then she can 
apply the “NC” (Non-Commercial) tag.  As shown in Figure 1, there are only six 
permitted combinations of these four licensing tags (out of 15 possible 
combinations), reflecting the designers’ views of the most frequent and logical 
types of uses that should be permitted. 
 
 
107 See Apache 2.0 License (“each Contributor hereby grants to You a perpetual, worldwide, non-
exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable (except as stated in this section) patent license to 
make, have made, use, offer to sell, sell, import, and otherwise transfer the Work, where such license 
applies only to those patent claims licensable by such Contributor that are necessarily infringed by 
their Contribution(s) alone or by combination of their Contribution(s) with the Work to which such 
Contribution(s) was submitted”). 
108 See Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 64 MONTANA L. REV. 1 (2004). 
109 The attribution feature of CC licenses bears similarities to the attribution feature of some OSS 
licenses. See Part II.A.2.a, supra. 
110 Share-alike licensing is similar to the “viral” feature of OSS licenses such as the GPL.  See Part 
II.A.2.c supra. 
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The Creative Commons suite of licenses 
 
The CC suite of licenses appears simple, but a sophisticated legal structure 
underlies its streamlined user-facing tags.  Thus, the tag “CC BY ND” does not 
itself convey a license to the user.  Rather, when a tag is attached to an online image 
or other content, it includes a hyperlink to a more comprehensive licensing 
agreement that is hosted on CC’s web site.111 
Importantly, the CC licenses are “public” licenses. That is, they are not 
specifically negotiated between copyright owners and users, but are publicly posted 
and can be “accepted” by anyone who wishes to use the licensed content.  Thus, 
the introduction to the CC BY NC ND 4.0 license reads as follows: 
By exercising the Licensed Rights (defined below), You accept and 
agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of this Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International Public License ("Public License"). To the extent this 
Public License may be interpreted as a contract, You are granted the 
Licensed Rights in consideration of Your acceptance of these terms 
and conditions, and the Licensor grants You such rights in 
 
 
111 For example, the full text of the CC BY NC ND 4.0 license can be found at 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode. 
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consideration of benefits the Licensor receives from making the 
Licensed Material available under these terms and conditions. 
The Creative Commons web site today claims that more than 500 million online 
images are available under CC licenses.  As Lessig and others intended, the appeal 
of the CC licensing system is its simplicity and its intuitiveness.  User can choose 
to apply one of six different combinations of four different licensing options to their 
works. Each option is described in simple, plain language and identified by an 
intuitive icon. Professor Jane Ginsburg points to four important design features that 
have contributed to the success of the CC model: its overall simplicity, its extension 
of credit to authors (included in each of the six permitted licenses), its ability to 
authorize use of the licensed content instantly and forever, and its potential to 
expand distribution of a work through search engines.112  These features have made 
CC licensing a standard feature of online platforms and social media sites today. 
 
C. IP Pledges 
As noted in Part II.B above, the formation of a patent pool often requires 
significant legal planning, negotiation, agreements concerning revenue sharing (if 
any), and an administrative structure. As a result, IP holders have found it 
increasingly expedient to make commitments regarding the enforcement and 
licensing of IP rights without the legal trappings, infrastructure, and overhead of 
formal pools. These commitments – IP pledges – are voluntary, unilateral promises 
made by IP holders to limit the enforcement or other exploitation of their IP rights, 
and are often coupled with more detailed public licensing agreements or 
statements.113  
 
1. Pledges as Clearing Mechanisms 
IP pledges enable a broad range of users to operate freely under the pledged IP. 
For the most part, such pledges are made without direct compensation or other 
consideration to the pledgor.114 This is not to say, however, that IP pledges are 
economically irrational; they may be supported by motivations ranging from 
promoting market development to forestalling governmental action to improving 
employee relations.115 A number of pledges have also been made to support IP 
 
 
112 Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors’ Transfer and License Contracts under US Copyright Law in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 3, 23 (Jacques de Werra, ed., 
2013). 
113 See, generally, Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543 (2015). 
114 The primary exceptions to this rule are the “FRAND” commitments made by participants in some 
standards-development organizations to license their patents on financial terms that are “fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory”.  See, e.g., Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 113, at x. 
115 See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 113, at 573-92; Jorge L. Contreras, The Evolving 
Patent Pledge Landscape, CIGI Papers No. 166 at pp. 7-8, Apr. 3, 2018, [Ehrensperger and Tietze]. 
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holders’ philanthropic, environmental and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
goals.116   
Thus, in most of these cases, pledges (and accompanying public licenses) 
enable users to operate under the pledged IP without fear of infringement.  Such 
freedom to operate can both encourage and enable users to develop, manufacture 
and sell products otherwise covered by the pledgor’s IP.  For example, when Tesla 
Motors CEO Elon Musk famously pledged in 2014 that Tesla would not assert its 
patents against others in the electric vehicle market, it was widely believed that the 
purpose of this pledge was to encourage the rapid development and deployment of 
electric vehicle infrastructure systems and components, thereby benefiting Tesla 
over its gasoline-powered competitors.117  
Yet few unilateral pledges, and not many collective pledges, can assure a user 
of complete freedom from IP (specifically patent) risks when it produces a 
commercial product.  In the high technology sector, many products are covered by 
many thousands of patents held by multiple firms,118 and even biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical products, once viewed largely as single-patent products, are 
covered by an increasing number of diversely held patents.119  What’s more, it is 
increasingly common that, through a combination of expansive claim drafting and 
shrewd market prediction, a firm’s patents can cover products developed entirely 
by others and to which the patent holder made no contribution at all.  
As a result, even the most carefully orchestrated patent landscape clearing 
mechanisms – whether implemented through patent pools or pledges -- cannot 
assure complete freedom from patent risk; there may always be “outsiders” who 
are not bound by the patent non-assertion commitments of others.120 For example, 
the Bluetooth standard for short-range wireless connectivity was developed by a 
group of firms that each committed to license its applicable patents to 
manufacturers of Bluetooth-enabled products and components without charge. Yet 
a non-practicing entity (NPE) that did not participate in the development of the 
standard held a patent, originally filed in connection with an unrelated technology, 
that was found by a Texas jury to read on Bluetooth and which entitled the NPE to 




116 Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 113, at 590-92 (identifying philanthropic pledges); 
Contreras, Evolving Landscape, supra note 115, at 7 (expanding category to encompass broader 
corporate mission such as corporate social responsibility and employee morale). 
117 See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 113, at x. 
118 Introduction, PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS at 
1 (C. Bradford Biddle, et al., eds., 2019). 
119 cite 
120 See Jorge L. Contreras, When a Stranger Calls: Standards Outsiders and Unencumbered Patents, 
12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 507 (2016) (discussing non-participants in standards-related 
pledges), Michael Mattioli, Patent Pool Outsiders, 33 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 225 (2018) (non-
participants in patent pools). 
121 Rembrandt Wireless Techs. LP v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Case No. 2:13-CV-213-JRG (E.D. 
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This being said, it is not essential that complete clearance exist in order for 
product markets to be made more accessible through pledging programs. The 
relevant question is how much “freedom to operate” is conferred by a particular 
pledge or pledge community.  If infringement risk is reduced below a certain 
threshold, then a market may be considered open, even if residual risk exists from 
outsider patent suits.  This point is discussed in greater detail when evaluating the 
adoption of the Open COVID Pledge within different market segments in Part IV.C, 
below. 
The following sections of this Part discuss IP pledges that have been made in 
response to global health crises – the EcoPatent Commons, an effort to make 
green/clean technologies available in the fight against climate change, and a 
number of recent pledges made in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
2. The EcoPatent Commons 
In January 2008, IBM, Nokia, Pitney Bowes and Sony launched an innovative 
project known as the EcoPatent Commons (EcoPC), the announced mission of 
which was “to manage a collection of patents pledged for unencumbered use by 
companies and IP rights holders around the world to make it easier and faster to 
innovate and implement industrial processes that improve and protect the global 
environment.”122 A total of thirteen firms eventually joined the EcoPC and 
collectively pledged a total of 248 “green technology” patents between its 
formation in 2008 and its discontinuation in 2016.123 
However, despite significant coverage in the press and academic literature,124 a 
study conducted by Contreras, Hall and Helmers found that the EcoPC failed to 
achieve any meaningful diffusion of the pledged technologies.125 Through 
interviews of EcoPC participants and organizers, the authors identified several 
possible explanations for the EcoPC’s inability to achieve its goals: 
[There were] several common critiques of the EcoPC’s structure and 
operational processes that help explain our quantitative findings, 
particularly EcoPC’s inability to provide information regarding the 
usage of contributed technologies. Another major impediment to 
diffusion was the lack of information provided by pledging 
companies beyond the patent documents that could have helped 
potential users (especially in developing countries) see potential 
applications of the pledged technologies. Finally, no concerted 
effort was made to group or link patents in the commons to any 
 
 
Tex. Jun. 5, 2013). See also Contreras, Stranger, supra note 120, at x (finding that a material number 
of assertions of standards-essential patents are brought by outsiders to the standardization process).   
122 Eco-Patent Commons, The Eco-Patent Commons: A Leadership Opportunity for Global 
Business to Protect the Planet (2013). 
123 See Contreras, et al., EcoPatent, supra note 51, at 74. 
124 Id. at 68-69. 
125 Id. at 70-71. 
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particular technology. This lack of coordination may have limited 
synergies that could have been created through a more deliberate 
approach to the technologies covered by contributed patents.126 
Despite these shortcomings, the EcoPC was an ambitious and innovative effort 
directed toward an urgent public need.  As such, it offers valuable lessons for the 
designers of future industry-driven efforts to open intellectual property for public 
use, and in many respects served as a model for the Open COVID Pledge. 
 
3. COVID-19 Pledges 
The COVID-19 pandemic gave rise to a number of unilateral and collective IP 
pledges, several of which were made during the early days of the pandemic.127 
Several of these are described below. 
 
a. Wellcome Trust Publishers Pledge 
The first pandemic-related IP pledge related to copyrights. On January 31, 
2020, the Wellcome Trust, a large UK-based medical charity, led a group of 
approximately thirty scientific and medical publishers in committing to make all 
peer-reviewed research publications relating to COVID-19 available without 
charge on an open access basis.128 The signatories included publishers such as 
Elsevier, Cell Press, Karger, the JAMA Network, the New England Journal of 
Medicine, Oxford University Press, Springer Nature, Taylor & Francis, Wiley and 
Wolters Kluwer. The initiative echoed earlier pledges of similar scope made with 
respect to research concerning the earlier Zika and Ebola outbreaks.129 
 
b. Ventilator Manufacturers 
Some of the first pandemic-related patent pledges were made by hospital 
ventilator manufacturers Smiths Group (March 21, 2020) and Medtronic, Inc. 
(March 30, 2020). In connection with its pledge, each of these companies released 
the electronic design files associated with a particular ventilator model and 
 
 
126 Id. at 71. 
127 See Jorge L. Contreras, et al., Pledging intellectual property for COVID-19, 38 NATURE 
BIOTECH. 1146, 1147, Table 1 (2020).  A summary can be found in Table 1, infra. 
128 Wellcome Trust, Sharing research data and findings relevant to the novel coronavirus (COVID-
19) outbreak, Jan. 31, 2020, https://wellcome.org/coronavirus-covid-19/open-data (visited Feb. 2, 
2021). 
129 Wellcome Trust, Statement on data sharing in public health emergencies, Jan. 31, 2016, 
https://wellcome.org/press-release/statement-data-sharing-public-health-emergencies (pertaining to 
Zika) (visited Feb. 2, 2021); Wellcome Trust, Sharing research findings and data relevant to the 
Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo, https://wellcome.org/press-release/sharing-
research-findings-and-data-relevant-ebola-outbreak-democratic-republic-congo (pertaining to 
Ebola) (visited Feb. 2, 2021). 
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authorized others to use those files and accompanying software to manufacture and 
sell ventilator products on a royalty-free basis.130  
The Smiths pledge is not publicly available and appears to be extended only to 
other members of the UK government’s Ventilator Challenge Consortium.131  
Medtronic requires any user that wishes to download its design files to register 
on its web site.132 It then grants users a non-exclusive license that extends until the 
later of the end of the WHO-declared Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern or October 1, 2024.133 The license requires users that modify the 
Medtronic files or software to make those modifications available on terms 
identical to those extended under Medtronic’s license (i.e., a share-alike or 
copyleft-style requirement).134 
 
c. UC Berkeley Innovative Genomics Institute 
The Innovative Genomics Institute (IGI) at University of California Berkeley is 
a Howard Hughes-funded, semi-autonomous research group that has achieved 
global recognition for its groundbreaking work on CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing (an 
accomplishment for which its President, Jennifer Doudna, received the Nobel Prize 
in Chemistry for 2020).  On March 23, IGI released an “Emergency COVID-19 
Technology Pledge” in which it committed to make technology that its researchers 
developed after March 13, 2020 available on a royalty-free basis to any entity 
conducting research on the diagnosis or treatment of COVID-19.135 To effectuate 
these rights, a user is required to enter into a license agreement with the University 




130 See Reuters, UK's Smiths makes ventilator available to other producers, Reuters, Mar. 21, 2020; 
Medtronic, Medtronic Shares Ventilation Design Specifications to Accelerate Efforts to Increase 
Global Ventilator Production, Mar. 30, 2020.  Though neither the Smiths nor the Medtronic pledge 
specifically mentions patents, the license grant of the Medtronic pledge speaks in terms of the 
statutory rights of a patent holder (“Medtronic hereby provides you a non-exclusive, royalty-free, 
world-wide license to the Design Materials to use, make, have made, manufacture, have 
manufactured, sell and have sold a ventilator … in response to the COVID-19 pandemic”) 
Medtronic, Permissive License – Open Ventilator Files, 
https://www.medtronic.com/content/dam/medtronic-
com/global/Corporate/covid19/documents/permissive-license-open-ventilator.pdf (visited Jan. 25, 
2021) [hereinafter Medtronic License]. 
131 See Contreras, et al., Pledging, supra note 127, at 1147 Table 1. 
132 Medtronic, Register to Download Ventilator Files, https://www.medtronic.com/us-en/e/open-
files.html?cmpid=vanity_url_medtronic_com_openventilator_Corp_US_Covid19_FY20 (visited 
Jan. 25, 2021). 
133 Medtronic License, supra note 130. 
134 Id.  See Parts x and x, supra (discussing share-alike and copyleft licenses). 
135 https://innovativegenomics.org/news/our-pledge-to-share-covid-19-ip/.  See also University of 
California, Berkeley, Office of Technology Licensing, Special Non-Exclusive Limited License 
Between [  ] And The Regents Of The University Of California For Covid-19 Limited Applications 
Of Intellectual Property (copy on file with the author). 
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On April 7, 2020 (the same day that the OCP was launched), several major 
research universities publicly committed to make their intellectual property broadly 
available for use in the COVID-19 response.  One such effort in the U.S. was led 
by Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and 
Stanford University (collectively referred to as HMS).  The HMS “COVID-19 
Technology Access Framework” is described as follows: 
We are committed to implementing COVID-19 patenting and 
licensing strategies that are consistent with our goal of facilitating 
rapid global access. For most types of technologies, this includes the 
use of rapidly executable non-exclusive royalty-free licenses to 
intellectual property rights that we have the right to license, for the 
purpose of making and distributing products to prevent, diagnose 
and treat COVID-19 infection during the pandemic and for a short 
period thereafter.136 
As of January, 2021, twenty additional U.S. research institutions and one non-
U.S. university had also “signed” this commitment.137 While the HMS Framework 
does not utilize a self-executing “public” licensing agreement, the universities 
commit to using a “rapidly executable” agreement.  The licenses to be granted are 
both non-exclusive and royalty-free, features designed to ensure broad access.  The 
term of the licenses is the COVID-19 pandemic plus “a short period thereafter”, 
and their scope is limited to making and distributing products intended to prevent, 
diagnose and treat COVID-19 infection.   
One important feature of the HMS licenses is their express expectation that 
users will commit “to distribute the resulting products as widely as possible and at 
a low cost that allows broad accessibility during the term of the license”.138 This 
type of “downstream” pricing constraint is intended to ensure that technology 
licensed on a royalty-free basis is not priced so high by manufacturers that certain 
users cannot afford it.   
It is unclear at this time how many, and to whom, licenses have been granted 
under the HMS Framework, and with respect to what intellectual property, as this 
information does not appear to be publicly available. 
 
 
136 Stanford Off. Tech. Licensing, COVID-19 Technology Access Framework,  
https://otl.stanford.edu/covid-19-technology-access-framework 
137 The full list includes: The Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard, Cornell University, Dartmouth 
College, Drexel University, Georgetown University, King Abdullah University of Science and 
Technology, Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, Mississippi State University, Northeastern 
University, Ohio State University, Oregon Health & Science University, Oregon State University, 
RTI International, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, University of Louisiana at 
Lafayette, University of Maryland, College Park, University of Nevada Reno, University of South 
Alabama, University of Texas at San Antonio, Virginia Commonwealth University, and Yale 
University. Id. (visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
138 Id. 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3780850






e. Oxford and AstraZeneca 
Approximately two weeks after the announcement of the HMS Framework, 
Oxford University unveiled a similar program.139  But in August, Oxford is reported 
to have granted pharmaceutical giant AstraZeneca an exclusive license to the 
university’s COVID-19 vaccine technology with no pricing constraints.140 
Oxford’s apparent abandonment of its earlier pledge has attracted criticism,141 but 
has not yet been challenged on legal grounds.142  
Interestingly, AstraZeneca itself pledged to distribute the vaccine “at no profit 
for the duration of the pandemic”,143 though some debate has emerged regarding 
the company’s apparent discretion to declare an end to the pandemic far earlier than 
public health authorities.144 
 
f. AbbVie 
On March 18, 2020, Israel’s Minister of Health issued a permit for the 
importation of generic versions of AbbVie’s patented AIDS drug Kaletra for the 
purpose of treating COVID-19.145  Two days later, AbbVie announced that it would 
no longer enforce patents relating to Kaletra anywhere in the world.146 AbbVie’s 
pledge was widely viewed as a response to Israel’s action, and was possibly at 
attempt to avoid compulsory licensing orders by other governments.147  
 
 
139 Oxford Univ. Innovation, Expedited access for COVID-19 related IP, 
https://innovation.ox.ac.uk/technologies-available/technology-licensing/expedited-access-covid-
19-related-ip/ (visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
140 Jay Hancock, Oxford’s COVID vaccine deal with AstraZeneca raises concerns about access and 
pricing, FORTUNE, Aug. 24, 2020, https://fortune.com/2020/08/24/oxford-astrazeneca-covid-
vaccine-deal-pricing-profit-concerns/ (visited Jan. 27, 2021). Oxford does not appear to have 
commented on these reports.  See Donato Paolo Mancini, AstraZeneca vaccine document shows 
limit of no-profit pledge, Oct. 7, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/c474f9e1-8807-4e57-9c79-
6f4af145b686. 
141 See Luke McDonagh, Could university patents stand in the way of universal global access to a 
COVID-19 vaccine? LSEThinks, Sept. 10, 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2020/09/10/could-
university-patents-stand-in-the-way-of-universal-global-access-to-a-covid-19-vaccine/ (visited Jan. 
27, 2021). 
142 See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 113 (discussing legal grounds for enforcement of 
patent pledges under U.S. law). 
143 AstraZeneca, AZD1222 vaccine met primary efficacy endpoint in preventing COVID-19, News 
Release, Nov. 23, 2020, https://www.astrazeneca.com/content/dam/az/media-centre-docs/press-
releases/2020/AZD1222-HLR-RNS.pdf. 
144 See Mancini, supra note 140. 
145 See note x, supra, and accompanying text. 
146 See Donato Paolo Mancini and Hannah Kuchler, AbbVie drops patent rights for Kaletra antiviral 
treatment, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 23, 2020; Ed Silverman, AbbVie will allow generic copies of its 
HIV pill in Israel after the government approved a license, STAT, Mar. 20, 2020. 
147 See Silverman, supra note 146 (noting AbbVie’s historical “aversion to compulsory licensing” 
in other contexts (quoting Prof. Brook Baker)). 
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g. Open COVID-19 Declaration (Japan) 
In early May, 2020, two Japanese business executives and a professor from 
Kyoto University organized a Japan-focused pledge community similar to the 
OCP.148 The pledge, administered by a venture-backed biotechnology firm called 
GenoConcierge, quickly attracted major Japanese industrial firms from the 
automotive, electronics and healthcare industries.149 Pledgors include LSI 
Medience and SRL Inc., which provide COVID-19 diagnostic testing, Mitsubishi 
Chemical, which operates in the health care sector, and Teijin, a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer.150 To date, the Japanese program claims that over one hundred 
organizations have pledged nearly one million patents toward “any activities whose 
sole purpose is stopping the spread of COVID-19, including diagnosis, prevention, 
containment and treatment.”151 In addition to patents, the pledge covers utility 
models, designs and copyrights.152 
Like the OCP, the Japanese pledge permits firms to modify the terms on which 
they are willing to make their IP available to users.  As reported by one press 
account, eighteen pledgors had modified these terms by late May, 2020.153 The 
modifications include requirements that users notify pledgors of their activities and 
the patents that they intend to use, and potential limitations to the term of the license 
extended.154 In addition, concerns have been raised regarding the language of the 
pledge, which extends only to activities whose “sole” purpose relates to COVID-
19.155 
h. Moderna 
On October 8, 2020, mRNA vaccine maker Moderna, Inc. publicly pledged not 
to enforce its COVID-19 related patents against “those making vaccines intended 
to combat the pandemic.”156 In its pledge, Moderna refers to its “special obligation 
under the current circumstances to use our resources to bring this pandemic to an 
end as quickly as possible.”157 Yet other benefits may accrue to Moderna from its 
commitment not to assert its patents.  First, the U.S. National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), which funded at least some of Moderna’s vaccine R&D, is reported to have 
 
 
148 See Jacob Schindler & Bing Zhao, Top Japanese corporates pledge patent non-assertion to speed 
virus fight, INTELL. ASSET MGT., May 7, 2020. 
149 Id. 
150 GenoConcierge Kyoto, OPEN COVID-19 DECLARATION, https://www.gckyoto.com/covid-
2-1 (visited Feb. 2, 2021). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Jacob Schindler, Japanese covid-19 patent pledge triples membership, but users must read fine 
print, INTELL. ASSET MGT., May 25, 2020. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. (discussing possible interpretations of “sole purpose”). 
156 Moderna, Statement by Moderna on Intellectual Property Matters during the COVID-19 
Pandemic, Oct. 8, 2020, https://investors.modernatx.com/news-releases/news-release-
details/statement-moderna-intellectual-property-matters-during-covid-19 (visited Jan. 25, 2021). 
157 Id. 
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claimed an interest in some of Moderna’s patents.158 Moderna’s pledge could have 
helped to persuade NIH to drop its claims to the patents, given their reduced 
licensing value. In addition, one watchdog group has alleged that Moderna failed 
to make legally required disclosures of federal funding for the inventions 
underlying some of its patents, leading to an ongoing investigation by the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).159 Unlike most of the other 
pledgors discussed above, Moderna was the subject of a significant public 
campaign to make its vaccine technology more broadly available.160 
 
Table 1, below, summarizes the principal terms of these pledges made in 
response to COVID-19 and situates the Open COVID Pledge chronologically 
within this group. 
 
 
158 Adam Houldsworth, Potential breakthrough covid vaccine faces even greater IP uncertainties, 
INTELL. ASSET MGT., Aug. 20, 2020, https://www.iam-media.com/litigation/potential-
breakthrough-covid-vaccine-faces-even-greater-ip-uncertainties; Jorge L. Contreras, 
Deconstructing Moderna’s COVID-19 Patent Pledge, BILL OF HEALTH, Oct. 21, 2020, 
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/21/moderna-covid19-patent-pledge/. 
159 Luis Gil Abinader, 2020:3 KEI Research Note: Moderna failures to disclose DARPA funding in 
patented inventions, August 27, 2020, https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/RN-2020-
3.pdf. 
160 See Joyce Farley, Moderna Should Free All COVID-19 IP, Free the Vaccine for COVID-19, 
Nov. 19, 2020, https://freethevaccine.org/2020/11/19/uaem-press-release-moderna-should-free-all-
covid-19-ip/ (discussing civil society campaign, including August 2020 protest at Moderna’s 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, headquarters). 
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Intellectual Property Pledges in Response to COVID-19 












AbbVie 3/19/20 Pledge n/a Kaletra/Aluvia 
patents 
n/a 
Smiths 3/21/20 Pledge ? Ventilator designs, 
software, patents 
Only offered  to members 











Specified patents  Only covers technology 
invented after 3/13/20 














+ 1 year or 
1/1/23 










unspecified Licensed products must 
be distributed at low cost 




Pandemic** unspecified Licensed products must 
be distributed free of 




5/7/20 Pledge PHEIC* Patents, utility 
models, designs, 
copyrights 
Applies to activities 
whose “sole purpose” is 
addressing COVID-19. 
Add’l restrictions may be 
added by pledgors 
Gilead Sciences 5/12/20 Licenses Pandemic** Remdesivir patents Licensed royalty-free to 5 
Indian and Pakistani 
generic drug makers 
Moderna 10/8/20 Pledge n/a mRNA vaccine 
patents 
n/a 
*  Duration of WHO-declared Public Health Emergency of International Concern 
** Duration of WHO-declared COVID-19 pandemic 
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III.  ANATOMY OF THE OPEN COVID PLEDGE 
 
In early 2020, as COVID-19 infections rapidly spread around the world and 
stories of patent-related impediments to the supply of critical technologies began to 
surface, groups of scientists, engineers, and advocates came together at conferences 
and via discussion lists and collaboration platforms to explore ways that they might 
help. Would it be possible, some wondered, to create a platform that could enable, 
and thereby encourage, a broad range of organizations to commit their IP to the 
fight against the pandemic?  The legal structures described in Part II – open source 
code licensing, Creative Commons licenses and earlier IP pledges -- informed the 
effort to create a generalized platform for the contribution of intellectual property 
to this cause. This Part III describes the genesis and evolution of this effort and 
details some of the considerations that went into the design and drafting of the Open 
COVID Pledge. 
 
A. The Role of a New COVID-19 Pledge Community 
As discussed in Part I, there are several ways in which access to critical 
technologies may be facilitated in times of crisis. These include governmental 
measures, such as compulsory licensing, as well as voluntary pools coordinated by 
non-profit or intergovernmental bodies. The sudden onset and evident seriousness 
of COVID-19 led to rapid interventions by a handful of governments,161 but these 
initial actions did not precipitate a broader cascade of governmental relaxation of 
IP rights. Especially in the United States, strong internal opposition to the 
weakening of IP rights made such interventions unlikely.162  Moreover, formal 
patent pools, while potentially valuable, require significant time, funding, 
administrative support and political willpower to develop.163  
In contrast, voluntary pledges that a number of IP holders, such as Medtronic, 
Smiths Group and AbbVie, made early in the pandemic achieved expanded access 
to key technologies quickly and with a minimum of administrative overhead. But 
as valuable as these unilateral actions were, they represented one-off interventions 
designed with a particular company’s rights, goals and markets in mind.   
The founders of the Open COVID Pledge believed that a more generalized 
platform for IP contributions could facilitate pledges by organizations that did not 
wish to re-invent the wheel (with the concomitant expenditures of managerial and 
legal resources), or that wished to participate in a collective activity with broad-
based industry support. Such a platform could also offer an avenue for meaningful 
contributions by holders of IP in industries that were not directly targeted by 
organized pooling efforts (i.e., while vaccines and therapeutics have received 
 
 
161 See Part I.B.1, supra. 
162 See id. 
163 See Part I.C.3, supra 
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significant attention in international pooling proposals, medical equipment and 
software applications have not). 
Such a legal framework, once available, could also be utilized by governments 
that wished to encourage (or require) parties receiving research grants and 
procurement funding to make the resulting IP broadly available.164  In a similar 
vein, a common legal framework for pledging IP could be used by international 
pooling efforts such as the WHO’s COVID Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) as a 
lightweight alternative to a formal IP pool structure.165 
For all of these reasons, the need presented itself for an independent, 
lightweight framework to enable IP sharing by a broad range of entities in the fight 
against COVID-19. 
 
B. Organization – The Open COVID Steering Committee166 
The Open COVID Pledge arose from discussion threads among researchers at 
the Innovative Genomics Institute at University of California Berkeley, the 
Department of Genetics at Stanford University, and the Engineering Department at 
the University of Cambridge. As these discussions moved toward potential legal 
interventions, legal academics and practitioners familiar with IP sharing structures 
were invited to join.   
By mid-March, 2020, at least three sets of written proposals for a common IP 
sharing platform had been circulated by different groups. Shortly thereafter, a self-
designated core of volunteers coalesced to reconcile the different approaches.  This 
small group referred to itself as the Open COVID Coalition and, later, as the OCP 
Steering Committee,167 and included four academic scientists and engineers, a 
practicing engineer, two legal academics and two practicing attorneys, with 
individuals based at various organizations in the western U.S. and the UK.168   
Most of these individuals had prior professional or personal connections with 
at least some other members of the group,169 thereby leveraging personal networks 
to facilitate both formation and collaboration. Importantly, each individual brought 
different but overlapping expertise to the group in complementary areas including 
biological science, product engineering, software development, technology 
dissemination, patent analysis, and intellectual property licensing. 
 
 
164 See Jorge L. Contreras, Expanding Access to Patents for COVID-19 in Assessing Legal 
Responses to COVID-19 at 158, 160 (Report Sponsored by the de Beaumont Foundation and 
American Public Health Association, Aug. 18, 2020); Frank Tietze [cite] 
165 See C-TAP Concept Paper, supra note 93, at 5 (integrating the OCP into WHO’s C-TAP 
program). 
166 The material in this Part is based on the author’s personal recollections, notes and email archives.  
167 See note 28, supra. 
168 Later, a marketing specialist was added. Additional assistance was provided by a number of 
student volunteers at Stanford University, Cornell University and elsewhere. 
169 The author, for example, had prior connections with four other Steering Committee members. 
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By mid-March, travel restrictions were in place across much of the world, so 
frequent meetings were held during late March and early April via Zoom, and 
document drafting and review progressed rapidly through email, Google Docs and 
the Slack collaboration platform. 
 
C. Design Requirements  
The goal of the Steering Committee was to create a legal framework for the 
rapid and broad commitment of IP rights to facilitate the discovery, development, 
manufacture and supply of critical technologies and equipment in the worldwide 
response to COVID-19. Such a framework would need to accommodate the 
requirements of both IP holders and IP users across multiple jurisdictions,  
As such, a number of fundamental design requirements were recognized early 
during the drafting process of what would come to be known as the Open COVID 
Pledge. 
The fundamental design requirements for the OCP were: 
1. Legal Enforceability – any commitment made by IP holders had to be 
legally enforceable.  Mere aspirational statements and expressions of intent were 
not sufficient.  The commitment of IP to the COVID-19 response via this 
mechanism was intended to be binding and, if need be, enforceable through the 
legal system. What’s more, given the number of lawsuits brought by PAEs, even in 
the COVID-19 area,170 the pledge needed to bind not only the pledgor, but any 
subsequent holder of the pledged IP.   
2. Broad Use of Pledged IP – the commitments made through the OCP should 
ensure the broadest possible use of the committed IP. This principle was recognized 
as important to ensure that the likely global demand for medical products and 
compounds would be addressed as expeditiously as possible. It was recognized that 
a requirement of broad usage would rule out the granting of exclusive licenses. 
However, it was also believed that the typical rationale for exclusive licensing – the 
need to give large financial incentivizes to innovators in order to undertake 
significant development risks and costs – might be offset in the context of COVID-
19 by governmental grant and procurement programs that could provide enormous 
financial incentives to innovators.171 
3. Supplier Acceptance – the legal framework for making commitments 
should not be so burdensome or punitive to IP holders that it would dissuade them 
from participating. That is, the requirements on IP holders (suppliers) should be as 
 
 
170 As noted in Part II, both Labrador Diagnostics and Swirlate, which asserted patents covering 
COVID-19 applications, are PAEs that acquired their patents from prior owners (Theranos and 
Panasonic, respectively).  The binding nature of IP pledges on successive IP holders has been 
discussed at length in the literature and has been the subject of several disputes.  SeeJorge L. 
Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 
UTAH L. REV. 479, x (2015). 
171 Contreras, Expanding Access, supra note 164. 
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reasonable as possible, within the constraints established by Requirements 1 and 2.  
In this way, the OCP should reflect the design of other open innovation frameworks 
“both to keep proprietary technologies safely protected within the boundaries of an 
integrated firm and to govern the collaboration and knowledge exchange across 




Key Design Requirements for the Open COVID Pledge 
 
 
As illustrated by Figure 2, these three requirements were seen as interacting 
with and counterbalancing one another.  For example, an overly legalistic structure 
(e.g., one requiring signed and notarized contracts for every transaction) could deter 
both IP holders and users from participating. Yet an insufficiently binding 
arrangement, while perhaps attractive to IP holders, would offer little comfort to 
potential IP users.  Likewise, structures that were too accommodating to users, such 
as contribution of IP to the public domain, might be unattractive to IP holders.173  
What was needed was a balance among these three fundamental requirements.  
 
D. Design Principles 
From the three fundamental design requirements for the OCP emerged a set of 
design principles that guided the creation of the OCP legal instrument. These design 
principles included the following: 
 
 
172 McGahan, et al., supra note 33, at 55. 
173 While some scholars have advocated an increased use of the public domain for open innovation 
(see, e.g., Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753 (2013)), this approach 
is often less appealing to IP holders than pledges because it represents an apparent abandonment of 
potentially valuable assets, it eliminates the holder’s ability to enforce IP against unauthorized uses 
(i.e., beyond the scope of the relevant pledge or license) and it relinquishes a potential weapon that 
can be used defensively in IP litigation.  For these reasons, even OSS licenses do not constitute a 
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1. Simplicity – in order to drive adoption by both IP holders and users, it was 
determined that the legal structure for the OCP should be as simple and intuitive as 
possible.  In this respect, the Creative Commons suite of licenses was viewed as an 
exemplar – the top-level CC ‘tags’ are straightforward and elegant in their design 
and understandable to non-lawyers around the world, yet each tag is linked to a 
comprehensive licensing agreement that contains a range of necessary terms and 
conditions.174 
2. Uniformity – in order to engender trust and to accelerate adoption, it was 
determined that the OCP should offer a uniform set of terms for adoption by IP 
holders. Like the Creative Commons licenses and popular OSI-certified OSS 
licenses, the use of a known set of terms that have been vetted and adopted by others 
is likely to achieve rapid uptake by IP holders. Likewise, from the perspective of 
users, there is significant benefit in using IP that is licensed under a consistent and 
well-understood set of terms, rather than a patchwork of bespoke licenses that 
varies from licensor to licensor. Uniform in-license terms enable a user to conduct 
its business without concern that certain licenses may not permit the desired 
activity, and without detailed monitoring of multiple licensing arrangements. 
3. Self-Execution – it was determined that, like Creative Commons and OSS 
licenses, as well as many patent pledges, the OCP should be a self-executing and 
anonymous license that did not require negotiation or signature by either party. 
Interposing administrative steps such as these into the licensing process would, it 
was felt, substantially lengthen the time required for each transaction and reduce 
the overall uptake of contributed IP.  Likewise, the introduction of a negotiated 
license, as well as requirements for tracking and reporting of use, could deter small 
and unsophisticated parties from using contributed IP.  Thus, unlike the pledge 
frameworks proposed by Berkeley IGI and HMS, the OCP would not require any 
form of written or electronic acknowledgement by users.  Rather, the OCP would 
make IP available to anyone who wished to use it with no strings attached. 
4. Limited Scope – from the standpoint of attracting IP holders, it was 
important to limit the scope of the Pledge to the COVID-19 pandemic and no more.  
As noted above, potential therapies, medical equipment and response systems that 
could be used in connection with COVID-19 might have existing and new uses 
beyond the pandemic. Yet asking IP holders to relinquish all potential applications 
of their technology would be excessive.  Thus, the scope of the OCP was limited to 
the COVID-19 pandemic and related activities.  In this sense, the OCP resembled 
the pledge made by pharmaceutical manufacturer AbbVie, which pledged not to 
assert patents covering its drug Kaletra, but only to the extent that the drug was 
used as a therapy for COVID-19 and not as a treatment for AIDS (the drug’s 
principal use and source of revenue).175 In a complementary vein, it is possible that 
a pledge of rights could popularize a particular technology developed by the 
 
 
174 By the same token, overly complex and unfamiliar licensing programs can deter participation. 
See Jorge L. Contreras, FRAND Market Failure: IPXI’s Standards-Essential Patent License 
Exchange, 15 CHI-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 419 (2016). 
175 See notes x, supra, and accompanying discussion.  
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pledgor, leading to potential commercial licensing opportunities after the end of the 
pandemic or in fields beyond COVID-19.176 
5.  No Charge – the crux of the OCP commitment is that it allows the use of 
pledged IP without charge.  There is little public benefit to facilitating or promoting 
paid licenses by IP holders. IP holders who wish to charge for licenses to use their 
IP are already in a position to do so, and potential users may approach them to 
negotiate a license on commercial terms.177  
In some industries, particularly electronics and telecommunications, 
participants in technical standards development organizations (SDOs) are required 
to commit to license their patents to users of standards on terms that are “fair, 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory” or FRAND.178 This type of pledge seeks to 
ensure broad adoption of the standardized technology while allowing patent holders 
to recoup their investment in technology development. The Steering Committee 
rejected this approach, however, as the meaning of FRAND, even in industries 
where it has been used for decades, is hotly contested and has led to significant 
litigation around the world.179 
In order to achieve the broadest possible dissemination and use of pledged IP, 
the Steering Committee determined that licenses must be free of charge, even if the 
inability to charge deters some IP holders from participating.180  Moreover, the 
absence of usage charges substantially contributes to the simplicity, uniformity and 
self-executability of the Pledge, as it does with Creative Commons and open source 




176 This “loss leader” strategy has been used to explain other IP pledges as well.  See Contreras, 
Patent Pledges, supra note 113, at 573 (describing “inducement” type pledges in which “the pledgor 
calculates that it is likely to derive greater benefit from the behavior that it seeks to induce in others 
than from using its patents to exclude others from the market.”) 
177 For this reason, we saw little value in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s vaunted “Patents 
4 Partnerships IP Marketplace Platform”, supra note x. 
178 Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 113. 
179 SeeJorge L. Contreras, Global Rate-Setting: A Solution for Standards Essential Patents?, 94 
WASH. LAW REV. 701 (2019). 
180 See discussion of potential financial motivations for lack of participation in Part x, infra. 
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Mapping of OCP Design Requirements to Design Principles 
 
 
E. Legal Structure 
The legal structure for the Open COVID Pledge is driven by the fundamental 
Design Requirements and Principles described in Parts C and D, above. The 
requirement for legal enforceability, including the need to ensure that subsequent 
holders of IP are bound by the pledgor’s commitments, suggested that the OCP be 
supported by a legally binding license agreement.181 Yet the design principle of 
simplicity dictated that the OCP be presented in a short and non-technical format, 
easily understandable to researchers and other non-lawyers. In this respect, the 
Creative Commons licenses offered an attractive model. As discussed in Part II.B, 
the different CC licensing modes are described with intuitive labels and graphical 
icons that are unobtrusively linked to more comprehensive legal licensing 
agreements in a two-tier structure. Though the formal CC licensing agreements are 
legal documents requiring a degree of legal sophistication to understand, most users 
rely primarily on the simple descriptors of licensing terms when deciding how to 
license their works.  
This being said, the license agreements utilized by CC are, like OSS licenses, 
“public” licenses that bind all persons and entities electing to download or use the 
licensed content, rather than bilateral, signed licensing agreements.  While the 
Berkeley IGI, HMS and Oxford pledges require users to execute individual license 
 
 
181 While numerous legal arguments have been advanced regarding the enforceability of IP pledges 
standing alone (see Contreras, Market Reliance, supra note 170, at x (discussing pledge enforcement 
theories based on contract, antitrust, estoppel and property law)), a more conservative approach 
utilizes a written licensing agreement, as licenses are typically interpreted as running with the 
licensed IP, notwithstanding a change of underlying ownership.  See [CONTRERAS, LICENSING, 
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agreements, the design principle of self-execution suggested that the OCP use the 
simpler approach of CC and OSS, with public licenses that do not require individual 
signature and delivery. 
Accordingly, a one-sentence “pledge” statement was developed, stating, at a 
high level, that the IP holder pledged certain IP to the fight against COVID-19.  
This pledge sentence was preceded by two introductory sentences describing the 
urgent need for such a pledge. After the pledge, a sentence referencing the more 
formal licensing agreement was added. The final text of the OCP, as released, read 
as follows: 
Immediate action is required to halt the COVID-19 Pandemic and 
treat those it has affected. It is a practical and moral imperative that 
every tool we have at our disposal be applied to develop and deploy 
technologies on a massive scale without impediment. 
We therefore pledge to make our intellectual property available 
free of charge for use in ending the COVID-19 pandemic and 
minimizing the impact of the disease. 
We will implement this pledge through a license that details the 
terms and conditions under which our intellectual property is made 
available. 
To implement a self-executing system for the OCP, a clickable “Make the 
Pledge” button was inserted below the text of the pledge.  When the button is 
clicked, the user is taken to a set of instructions for formalizing the relevant 
licensing terms.  Three steps are required in order for an IP holder to make the 
pledge: 
1. It must issue a public statement that it is making the Open COVID Pledge 
(i.e., by posting on a web site, issuing a press release, etc.), 
2. It must adopt a licensing agreement (see below) detailing the terms and 
conditions under which its intellectual property is made available, and 
3. It must email the Pledge organizers a link to the public statement and 
license, as well as a point of contact and a copy of the organization’s logo. 
The above approach ensures that the IP holder informs the public that it has 
pledged certain IP under the terms of the OCP, and enables the Steering Committee 
to announce this fact as well.  In practice, the Steering Committee has posted the 
logos of pledgors on its own web site shortly after they have made the pledge, both 
as recognition of their commitment and also to inform the user community that IP 
held by these entities is available under the terms of the Pledge. 
 
F. Key License Terms 
Armed with a set of design principles and an overarching legal structure, the 
Steering Committee, with input from the legal departments of a handful of early 
potential pledgors, next developed a set of formal licensing terms to effectuate the 
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Pledge. These terms were incorporated into a set of “template” license forms 
(referred to as Open COVID Licenses) that could easily be designated and adopted 
by pledgors.182 Below are some of the considerations that informed the 
development of the Open COVID Licenses, as well as a number of concessions and 
trade-offs that were dictated by the design principles described above. For 
reference, the full text of an Open COVID License is included in Appendix A. 
 
1. Licensed Rights 
The Open COVID Licenses cover two forms of intellectual property: patents 
and copyrights. As described above, concerns regarding patents motivated the 
project from the beginning.  Nevertheless, the Steering Committee debated whether 
to require pledgors to license their entire worldwide portfolio of patents, or to allow 
pledgors to select certain patents for licensing.  From an administrative standpoint, 
a blanket portfolio license would be easier to execute, whereas a license of specified 
patents could become complex with detailed descriptions of particular patent 
families and jurisdictions.  Because simplicity was an overriding concern of the 
Steering Committee, it was decided that the Open COVID Licenses would be 
drafted as worldwide portfolio licenses, but pledgors would be permitted to adopt 
customized licenses covering only selected patents (see Compatibility Assessment 
– Part III.G, below). 
The decision was made to include copyrights within the scope of the OCP given 
their importance to software and digital design files, both of which are integral to 
equipment and systems used in response to the pandemic. The pledge of 
copyrighted scientific articles by the Wellcome Trust group (see Part II.C.3.a, 
above) also weighed in favor of including copyrights in the Open COVID Licenses.  
However, given sensitivities of some potential pledgors in the software industry,183 
the OCP allows pledgors to choose a form of license that covers both patents and 
copyrights, only patents or only copyrights. 
Other forms of intellectual property are not covered by the OCP.  Trademarks 
are specifically excluded, as a licensee that manufactures a patented or copyrighted 
product under an OCL should not be permitted to label it with the licensor’s brand 
or logo absent a commercial relationship between the two.184  Such relationships 
typically require strict quality control procedures, which often involve the 
licensor’s careful selection of potential licensees and monitoring of the licensee’s 
 
 
182 It was anticipated from the beginning that some pledgors would insist on drafting their own 
licensing agreements.  To accommodate this approach, a set of compatibility criteria were 
developed.  See Part x, infra. 
183 For example, a software vendor might be willing to allow others to develop and distribute their 
own software that is covered by the pledgor’s patents, but not to copy and distribute the pledgor’s 
software without payment. 
184 See Theodore C. Max & Lindsay van Keulen, 3M Takes Action to Protect Its Brand from Price 
Gouging And Trademark Infringement, 10 NATL. L. REV. No. 126 (May 5, 2020); Michael R. Justus, 
Unmasking the Takeaways from 3M’s Lanham Act Litigation Against N95 Mask Price Gouging, 10 
NATL. L. REV. No. 218 (Aug. 5, 2020). 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3780850





product quality.185 Because such activity could impose substantial costs on the 
pledgor, and could not practically be effected through a lightweight public license, 
no trademark or related rights are granted. 
Similarly, the OCP does not cover trade secret, know-how or similar rights, nor 
does it require that the pledgor provide licensees with training, technical assistance, 
knowledge transfer or materials.  The Steering Committee was aware that, for 
certain products such as vaccines, patent licenses alone may be insufficient to 
enable a secondary supplier to manufacture the product.186 As the author has 
previously observed, “complex technologies often cannot be understood and 
implemented, especially by non-experts working in the developing world, merely 
through patent disclosures.”187 
For this reason, initiatives such as the Medicines Patent Pool and the proposed 
WHO COVID-19 pool aspire to include a broad range of enabling rights, materials 
and knowledge beyond patent rights.188 Nevertheless, the overriding design 
principles of simplicity and pledgor acceptability ruled out any requirement that 
pledgors take affirmative steps to train or enable licensees to make use of licensed 
rights. As with trademark quality control, it was felt that imposing costly and 
potentially unbounded obligations on pledgors would make the OCP unattractive 
to many pledgors.  Instead, the approach of the OCP is to make available legal 
rights only, without affirmative service or technology delivery obligations.189  
While this could make the OCP less useful in the context of know-how-heavy 
products such as vaccines (see Part IV.B.2, below), this compromise was felt to be 
necessary to secure a broad range of patent and copyright licenses that could be 
profitably utilized without the provision of additional services or materials.  
 
2. License Scope 
The scope of the Open COVID Licenses encompasses “diagnosing, preventing, 
containing, and treating COVID-19,” including all research relating to COVID-
19.190  While this field of use is broad, it is also constrained.  As noted above, many 
 
 
185 See CONTRERAS, LICENSING, supra note 100, at x. 
186 W. Nicholson Price II, Arti K. Rai, Timo Minssen, Knowledge transfer for large-scale vaccine 
manufacturing, 369 SCIENCE 912 (2020). 
187 Contreras, et al., EcoPatent, supra note 51, at 82-83 (identifying lack of technology transfer as a 
significant shortcoming of the EcoPatent Commons).  See also Reynolds et al., supra note 51, at x 
(discussing need for technology transfer in order to create effective ‘research commons’ for solar 
climate engineering). 
188 See Part x, supra. 
189 See OCP FAQ, supra note x (“The Open COVID License is simply a grant of legal rights. It does 
not require any cooperation, training, technical assistance or consultation by the pledgor, nor does 
it require reporting or consultation by the licensee, though we encourage those taking advantage of 
the pledge to share how they are using the pledge if appropriate, in order to encourage others to join 
in. If a cooperative arrangement would benefit both parties, we encourage them to negotiate one 
separately, with compensation if desired.”) 
190 Open COVID Pledge, FAQs, https://opencovidpledge.org/faqs/ (“Is research covered by the 
Pledge?  Yes. All forms of research are covered.”) (visited Jan. 30, 2021) [hereinafter OCP FAQ]. 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3780850





technologies used in the response to COVID-19, whether diagnostics, therapeutics, 
protective gear, medical devices or hospital equipment, have applications and uses 
beyond COVID-19.  A hospital ventilator, for example, can be used to treat a range 
of indications causing respiratory stress, and many therapeutics being tested for use 
against COVID-19 were originally developed and approved in connection with a 
range of other autoimmune disorders and infectious diseases.191 For example, 
AbbVie’s Kaletra drug, primarily used to treat AIDS, was considered as a potential 
COVID-19 therapy, and AbbVie’s unliateral pledge relating to Kaletra was limited 
to use in treating COVID-19.192 
The OCP is designed specifically to address the COVID-19 pandemic, not to 
open patents across the board for medical usage.  Thus if a particular patented 
product is useful against both COVID-19 and another disease indication, only the 
use against COVID-19 is licensed under an Open COVID License; the patent 
holder may continue to charge for other uses.  
Of course, this type of “single indication” license is vulnerable to abuse, 
especially as licensees are not required to report on their usage to pledgors.  A 
licensee could conceivably sell products purportedly for COVID-19 use, with the 
understanding that they can (or will) be used otherwise.  The Steering Committee 
felt that the risk of such abuse was not worth imposing more stringent reporting 
requirements on licensees (i.e., to achieve the goal of broad adoption).  If a licensee 
engaged in the large-scale sale of licensed products into non-COVID markets, it is 
likely that the pledgor would eventually discover this abuse; it could pursue an 
action for infringement.193 But at the margin, the Steering Committee determined 
that the risk of undetected unlicensed uses did not outweigh the need for a 
lightweight licensing framework without onerous reporting and monitoring 
provisions.194 
 
3. Waiver of Regulatory Exclusivities 
In the U.S., manufacturers of FDA-approved drugs receive a period of 
regulatory market exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman Act195 that is independent 
of the patent protection that they may also enjoy. Exclusivity periods range from 
six months (for the first generic version of a drug that is approved) to three years 
(for a new use of a previously approved drug) to five years (for a new drug 
compound) to seven years (for a new “orphan” drug).196 These periods may run 
 
 
191 See note 5, supra, and accompanying text.   
192 See notes x, supra, and accompanying text. 
193 See Contreras casebook at x (exceeding the scope of an IP license results in an unlicensed and 
infringing use). 
194 Even in high-value commercial licensing arrangements it is difficult to prevent the sale of all 
licensed products for unauthorized or off-label uses. See Contreras casebook at x. 
195 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355 & 360cc. 
196 See 21 C.F.R. 314.108, 316.31, 316.34 and sections 505A, 505E, 505(j)(5)(B)(iv), and Food, 
Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (21 U.S.C. § 505(j)(5)(B)(v)). For a summary, 
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concurrently with patent protection, but because they arise independently of patent 
rights, the grant of a patent license does not necessarily authorize the licensee to 
manufacture or sell the relevant product.  As a result, the Open COVID Licenses 
require the pledgor to waive the enforcement of any regulatory exclusivities 
associated with products covered by the licensed IP rights.197 
 
4. Term and Post-Termination Commitments 
The term of the Open COVID Licenses is defined as follows: 
This license is effective as of December 1, 2019 and lasts until one 
year after the World Health Organization declares the COVID-19 
Pandemic to have ended, but in any event not beyond January 1, 
2023, unless otherwise extended by the Pledgor.198 
The effective date for all licenses is December 1, 2019 to coincide roughly with 
the emergence of COVID-19 in Wuhan. This early date ensures that any potentially 
infringing activity undertaken by a licensee will be licensed retroactively once the 
license is granted and avoids the anomalous situation in which a licensee is 
authorized to operate under the licensed IP going forward, but remains liable for 
past infringing activity. 
The license extends until the end of the WHO-declared COVID-19 pandemic 
plus one year.  At the end of the license term (which of course may be extended by 
mutual agreement of the parties), the licenses granted will be terminated and of no 
further force or effect.  Thus, if a user wishes to continue to use the licensed IP after 
this date, or wishes to use the licensed IP for applications other than COVID-19, it 
must negotiate a separate license with the IP holder.   
 The one-year “tail” period following the end of the pandemic is intended to 
permit licensees to wind down their licensed activity, recognizing that COVID-19 
infections may still be prevalent in some parts of the world after COVID-19 ceases 
to qualify as a global pandemic.  The one-year wind-down period is also intended 
to give licensees a reasonable period to negotiate commercial licenses with pledgors 
for post-pandemic usage.  
The “outside date” of January 1, 2023 is intended to address the situation in 
which the WHO does not act expeditiously to lift its pandemic declaration.  Such 
an outside date is not required, and the OCL permits pledgors to offer licenses that 
 
 
see also, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/frequently-asked-questions-
patents-and-exclusivity#howlongexclusivity (visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
197 See Open COVID License – Patent Copyright – v. 1.1, Para. 3 (“REGULATORY 
EXCLUSIVITY - The Pledgor will not assert any regulatory exclusivity against any entity or 
individual for use of the Licensed IP in accordance with the license granted in Section 1, and we 
will not seek injunctive or regulatory relief to prevent any entity or individual from doing so.”) 
198 Open COVID License – Patent Copyright – v. 1.1, Para. 2. 
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have no outside date, or which do not expire at all (i.e., allowing licenses to run for 
the full duration of the licensed IP rights). 
There is no obligation on the part of pledgors to grant post-termination licenses, 
or to price post-termination licenses at fair or reasonable rates. Some have 
suggested that this lack of post-termination commitment by pledgors could result 
in “hold-up”, a situation in which users make substantial investments to 
manufacture and deploy licensed technology during the term of the license and are 
thus pressured to pay elevated rates to continue their use following termination.199  
Though the threat of hold-up is a real one, the Steering Committee deemed it more 
critical to make the Pledge as attractive as possible to IP holders by limiting its 
duration and scope solely to the COVID-19 pandemic. Unlike hold-up scenarios in 
other industries, in which a patent threat may be unknown prior to the investments 
made by users,200 potential users of pledged IP know, in advance, when the Open 
COVID Licenses terminate.  Thus, users should have sufficient information to price 
their products in a manner that recoups their investments during the term of the 
license, without any assurance of post-license continuation. 
 
5. No Sharealike or Grantbacks 
As discussed in Part II, CC “Share-Alike” and OSS “Copyleft” licenses require 
that a licensee make its own modifications and improvements to the licensed 
technology available to others on the same open terms as the underlying rights were 
made available to it.201 This approach was adopted by Medtronic in its COVID-19 
ventilator pledge.202 The theory behind such requirements is that the licensee 
obtains the licensed rights for free, and should thus contribute its own 
improvements to the community on a similar basis (or should at least be prevented 
from suing others who wish to use those improvements).203 
The Steering Committee debated whether or not to include a Share-Alike 
provision in the OCL, but determined, on balance, that such a provision could 
dissuade potential users from adopting and using (or at least improving) the 
licensed IP.204  Given the primary goal of promoting the broadest possible usage of 
the pledged IP, it was felt that greater dissemination would occur if users were not 
subject to such requirements. Thus, licensees are not required to grant any licenses 
with respect to their modifications and improvements to the licensed technology. 
This being said, pledgors who wish to impose Share-Alike requirements in their 
license agreements may do so and have their licenses certified as acceptable “OCL-
 
 
199 [Siebrasse on Hold-Up] 
200 [wireless telecom] 
201 See Parts x, supra. 
202 See note x, supra. 
203 See Contreras casebook, discussing these provisions. 
204 One indication of this is the reluctance that many commercial enterprises have to using software 
that is licensed on a copyleft basis.  See [Contreras, casebook]. 
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Alternative” licenses.205 Moreover, the Steering Committee encourages all IP 
holders, including licensees, to make their own pledges under the OCP.206 
 
6. Defensive Suspension 
Some fields relevant to COVID-19 are characterized by frequent patent 
disputes,207 and the unconditional pledging of an organization’s patents could place 
it at a significant disadvantage if it became involved in such a dispute.208  Thus, the 
OCL includes a clause that automatically suspends209 a license “if the licensee or 
any entity affiliated with the licensee threatens or initiates a suit or legal proceeding 
alleging the infringement of any patent or other intellectual property right against 
the Pledgor or any entity affiliated with the Pledgor.”210 This “defensive 
suspension” clause permits a pledgor to assert its IP “defensively” against a licensee 
that brings its own IP infringement against the pledgor.211 
One of the reasons that such a clause is necessary is because, as discussed in 
Part F.5, above, the OCL does not require that a licensee grant the pledgor any 
rights to modifications or improvements that the licensee makes to the licensed 
technology.  Thus, a pledgor could find itself in the unenviable position of granting 
a free license to a competitor, the competitor improving the licensed technology 
and obtaining IP protection for that improvement, and then suing the original 
pledgor for using a similar improvement. The defensive suspension clause, which 
suspends the effect of the OCL if the licensee threatens or brings such a suit, allows  
the pledgor to assert its IP covering the underlying IP against the licensee.  Of 
course, it is not a goal of the OCP to enable further IP litigation, but to orient the 
parties’ rights in such a manner that they are more likely to negotiate a satisfactory 
 
 
205 See Part x (compatibility), infra. 
206 See OCP FAQ, supra note x, (“Is the licensee required to grant any rights back to the IP holder? 
No. The license granted under the Open COVID Licenses is a one-way commitment from the 
pledgor to licensees. Licensees are not required to grant rights back to the pledgor. While this 
imbalance may seem unfair or inequitable in some ways, we believe that it will result in the greatest 
adoption of licenses by manufacturers and institutions around the world. And, of course, we 
encourage all holders of IP relating to COVID-19 to make the pledge as to their own IP.”) 
207 The field of vaccine development is one such field.  See [Rutschman] 
208 For example, a party that has licensed its IP to its competitors cannot thereafter assert such IP in 
a counterclaim if a competitor later sues it for infringement. 
209 The license is temporarily suspended rather than terminated outright to address the situation in 
which one division or subsidiary of a large organization asserts IP against an OCP pledgor without 
realizing that another division or subsidiary of the same organization is making use of a license 
granted under the OCP.  In effect, the suspension may be “cured” by the withdrawal of the 
infringement claim.  See OCP FAQ, supra note x (“If a licensee threatens or sues the pledgor for 
infringing any IP relating to COVID-19, then the license will automatically be suspended until that 
threat or suit is withdrawn.”) 
210 Open COVID License – Patent Copyright – v. 1.1, Para. 4. 
211 Such clauses are well-known in the licensing field.  See, e.g., CONTRERAS, LICENSING, supra 
note 100, at 551 (discussing “defensive termination” clause in Apache OSS license), AM. BAR ASSN. 
COMM. TECH. STANDARDIZATION, STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL 62-67 
(Jorge L. Contreras, ed., 2007) (discussing defensive suspension clauses in standards policies) 
[hereinafter ABA Standards Manual].  
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commercial arrangement covering use of the licensee’s improvements. The 
defensive suspension clause achieves this orientation. 
 
7. No Downstream Pricing Controls 
Downstream pricing controls are used in licensing agreements to ensure that the 
licensee does not charge excessive prices for licensed products. For example, A 
grants a license to B, and requires that any products sold by B under authority of 
the license be priced at cost, or at reasonable levels.  
Controls such as this are particularly salient when the license from A to B is 
granted without compensation – if A grants a free license to B, then it is not 
unreasonable for A to expect that B will not make excessive profits by selling 
licensed products.  Such “downstream” pricing controls were utilized by the U.S. 
National Institutes of Health during the 1990s in its Cooperative Research and 
Development Agreements (CRADAs) with private industry,212 and more recently 
have been used in licensing agreements with the Medicines Patent Pool.213  The 
COVID-19 licensing frameworks developed by Oxford University and Harvard-
MIT-Stanford also include pricing limitations for licensed products.214 
However, the OCL does not include downstream pricing controls for a number 
of reasons. First, implementing and enforcing such controls would require 
significant reporting by licensees and monitoring by pledgors.  This, in turn, would 
require the establishment of confidentiality relationships between pledgors and 
licensees, as pricing information is often confidential.  All of which substantially 
increases the complexity of the relationship. Second, agreements relating to product 
pricing, particularly if made among competitors, invariably give rise to antitrust 
concerns, as they (or their enforcement) could enable illegal price fixing or 
coordination.  Finally, as noted in Part x, above, it is notoriously difficult to 
determine what “fair and reasonable” prices are.  Imposing a condition that product 
pricing meet any subjective standard could be a recipe for litigation.  For all of these 
reasons, it was determined that including pricing controls on downstream products 
in the OCL would introduce significant administrative burdens and disincentives 
for user adoption, while offering only modest benefits during the limited duration 




212 See Jorge L. Contreras, What Ever Happened to NIH’s “Fair Pricing” Clause?, Bill of Health, 
Aug. 4, 2020, https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/04/nih-fair-pricing-drugs-covid19/. 
213 [cite] 
214 See Part II.C.2.c, supra.  Universities have long experimented with pricing controls for products 
destined for sale in the developing world.  See Nine Points and CONTRERAS, LICENSING, supra note 
100, at 396-98 (discussing university humanitarian licensing initiatives). 
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8. No Warranties or Indemnities 
The OCL is intended as a broad immunity from suit, rather than a guaranty that 
any particular product can be manufactured, sold or marketed.215  Thus, pledgors 
are not required to make any representations or warranties to licensees, and all IP 
is licensed on an “AS IS” basis.  Licensees must assume responsibility for clearing 
their products against any applicable IP (including IP that is not licensed under the 
OCL), as well as regulatory and other governmental requirements.  This approach 
is similar to that adopted by most OSS and CC licenses, and even with many 
royalty-bearing academic patent licenses. 
 
G. Compatibility Assessment 
The principle of uniformity requires that the terms on which pledged IP are 
licensed to users are as uniform as possible across IP holders.  In order to encourage 
uniformity, the Steering Committee developed a set of “template” licensing 
agreements – one for the licensing of patents only and one for the pledging of 
patents and copyrights.  These “Open COVID Licenses” (OCL) are posted on the 
OCP web site and may be adopted by any pledgors.  
However, the Steering Committee quickly realized that many IP holders, 
particularly large organizations, have individual sensitivities and concerns that 
make them unwilling to use a standardized licensing agreement. In order to increase 
the attractiveness of the OCP to potential pledgors, the Steering Committee 
implemented a process whereby potential pledgors may submit proposed licensing 
agreements to the Committee for review, much as the creators of new OSS licenses 
may submit them to OSI.216  If, after review, the Committee determined that the 
terms of the proposed license were consistent with those of the OCP template 
agreements, the proposed license was deemed “OCL-Compatible”.  If the terms of 
the proposed license were mostly consistent with the terms of the Open COVID 
Licenses, but deviated in one or more ways deemed nevertheless to preserve the 
intent of the OCP, the proposed license was deemed to be an acceptable “OCL-
Alternative” license. If, however, the proposed license deviated in some material 
way with the Open COVID Licenses, it was deemed “incompatible” and an IP 
holder adopting it would not be considered to have made the Pledge. 
 
 
215 See OCP FAQ, supra note x (“Does the pledge guarantee that a licensee will be able to 
manufacture or sell any particular product? No. Some products may be covered by IP that is held 
by multiple parties. In order to manufacture or sell such products, the manufacturer must ensure that 
it has obtained rights from all holders of IP. We recognize that it may be difficult to determine who 
owns all of these rights. But that is a problem that exceeds the scope of what the Open COVID 
License can accomplish except through identification of some pledgors and, if provided, the IP 
rights made subject to the pledge. Our hope, of course, is that all major holders of COVID-related 
IP will adopt the pledge, making the production of these technologies free from IP risk. However, 
this cannot be guaranteed.”) 
216 OSI review 
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A list of compatibility criteria were developed to guide the review process.217  
For example, certain CC and OSS licenses are automatically deemed to be OCL-
compatible. In order to be deemed OCL-Compatible, customized licenses must 
contain certain minimum terms such as a scope and duration at least as broad as the 
Open COVID Licenses and may not bear royalties or other charges. OCL-
Alternative licenses may include one or more specified terms that, on their face, are 
inconsistent with the OCL Licenses, but which, overall, preserve the intent of the 
OCP. Terms that are permitted in OCL-Alternative but not in OCL-Compatible 
licenses include share-Alike, copyleft and grant back clauses that require the 
licensee to make modifications and derivatives of licensed IPR available on 
similarly open terms, limiting licensees to particular countries, or excluding 
particular countries, but only when required by applicable legal regulations,  
limiting the field to medical and research use only (e.g., excluding home 
entertainment applications, even when related to COVID-19), or requiring that the 
licensee to register as a user.   
However, some restrictions and limitations are deemed to be so inconsistent 
with the spirit of the OCP and its fundamental design principles that licenses 
containing them will not certified as either OCL-Compliant or OCL-Alternative.  
For example, restrictions on commercial use could severely limit the use of pledged 
rights, and will thus make a proposed license non-compliant. Likewise, 
“downstream” pricing requirements (e.g., requiring that the licensee make licensed 
products available at no charge, at cost or at “fair and reasonable”) charges could 
reduce users’ willingness to utilize the licensed rights and thus limit their usefulness 
in combatting the pandemic. Prohibiting the licensee from making derivatives or 
modifications of the licensed IP or requiring the licensee to assign to the licensor 
rights in derivatives or modifications of the licensed IP would also be significant 
disincentives for users to use and improve the licensed IP.  Of course, the licensor’s 
charging fees of any kind, including reimbursement of expenses, disqualifies 
licenses from the OCP, as does requiring the licensee to report sales or other 
utilization to the licensor. Finally, a duration that is shorter than the OCL term (the 
earlier of the end of the COVID-19 pandemic plus one year, or January 1, 2023) is 
disqualifying, both because of its significant potential to reduce uniformity among 
licenses, and because it limits the usefulness of pledged IP to address the pandemic. 
 
H. Notice of Pledged IP 
In order for an IP pledge to achieve the pledgor’s goals, potential users must be 
made aware of the pledge as well as the IP that is available for use – the so-called 




218 See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note x, at 596 (“In order for a pledge to achieve the 
pledgor’s desired effect … broad public dissemination or “notice” of the pledge is desirable. 
Likewise, in order to extend the benefit of the pledge to the entire intended category of beneficiaries 
… broad public notice is also desirable”). See also Clark D. Asay, The Informational Effects of 
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broad use of pledged IP is a lack of widely disseminated information about the IP 
that is available for use.219  
In the case of the OCP, the dissemination of information relating to pledged IP 
presents several challenges.  First, the large number of patents pledged (see Part 
IV.A, below) makes any attempt to list individual patents infeasible.220 Several 
early pledgors held tens of thousands of patents each and, as any patent practitioner 
knows, the “docket” information for such portfolios is voluminous, complex and 
constantly changing. Listing individual patents would impose an insurmountable 
burden on the pledgors’ in-house legal departments, and would have been 
impossible for any outsider to compile accurately.  What’s more, a listing of tens 
or hundreds of thousands of patents, whether organized by assignee, issuance date 
or patent number, would be of little use to potential users.221 Finally, copyrights, 
which lack even the registration information of patents, are notoriously difficult to 
catalog with any degree of specificity. 
Though a comprehensive listing of pledged IP was neither feasible nor 
particularly useful for the OCP, the Committee sought ways to disseminate 
information regarding pledged IP to potential users and to make this information 
easily accessible.  It undertook two approaches in this regard, and has developed 
plans for a third. 
 
1. Featured IP  
One of the methods adopted by the OCP to highlight pledged IP was to develop 
a number of vignettes describing pledged IP and how it was being, or could be, 
used in the response to COVID-19.  Each of these vignettes identifies the relevant 
 
 
Patent Pledges in PATENT PLEDGES: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT LAW’S PRIVATE ORDERING 
FRONTIER 227, 227 (Jorge L. Contreras & Meredith Jacob, eds., 2017) (“patent pledgers use patents 
to efficiently and credibly convey information to the relevant public about their innovation 
preferences and activities. Transmission of this information may then facilitate a variety of 
economic objectives, depending on the nature of the pledge”). 
219 See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note x, at 596 (“despite [the] pressures toward broad 
dissemination and notice of pledges, many patent pledges falter as to the notice function”), 
Contreras, et al., EcoPatent, supra note 51, at 82 (notification of pledged IP “was not particularly 
intuitive or informative”, contributing to lack of use), Nicole Shanahan, Overcoming Information 
Asymmetry in Patent Pledge Records in PATENT PLEDGES, supra note 218, at 301 (“The way patent 
pledges are publicized and made available today is not effective in reaching an optimal level of 
distribution of the underlying open access contained in these pledges.”), Colleen V. Chien & Evan 
Hastings, Spurring and Clearing the Path for Open COVID Innovation Through Contextual Patent 
Disclosure, Patently-O blog, May 21, 2020, https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/05/innovation-
contextual-disclosure.html (“without context, in particular reliable assignee or product information, 
may be hard-pressed to find relevant technology”). 
220 There was some disagreement within the Steering Committee regarding this conclusion.  This 
article reflects the views of the author.  But see Meredith Jacob, Best Practices for Making Patent 
Pledges in PATENT PLEDGES, supra note 218, at 317, 318 (recommending enumeration of each 
patent pledged). 
221 Even the EcoPatent Commons, which included a list of only __ patent families, was viewed as 
difficult for potential users to understand.  See Contreras, et al., EcoPatent, supra note 51, at 82. 
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pledgor and includes a short textual description, some keywords (tags), an 
illustrative image, and a list of relevant patent numbers or other technical details (if 
the viewer clicks the “Learn More” button).  Below are four examples of featured 
IP on the OCP website:222 
 
Figure 4 
Featured IP on the Open COVID Pledge Website 
 
It was hoped that these use cases would inspire potential users to explore the 
pledged IP and use it in creative ways.  As of this writing, approximately thirty 
“Featured IP” vignettes are posted on the OCP website [and an effort is under way 
to develop more with student volunteers.] 
 
2. Patent Searching 
The second prong of OCP’s IP dissemination effort involves a natural language 
processing (NLP) search engine that enables users to search patents pledged under 
the OCP.  Search functionality is provided by Swedish analytics firm IPScreener, a 
third party that adapted its existing NLP to target OCP-pledged patents.223  It is 
hoped that this search functionality will enable potential users to identify patents 
relevant to particular areas in which they may wish to operate.   
 
3. Topical Index 
Another goal of the OCP is to create a comprehensive “index” of topics covered 
by pledged IP, with links to relevant IP.  Thus, relevant IP would be indexed and 
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diagnostic kits, disinfecting solutions, vaccines, therapeutics, and many more. The 
beginnings of this system already exist in the keyword tags identified in the 
Featured IP vignettes. It is anticipated that, once completed, such a resource will be 
useful in informing potential users of the types of technology projects that can be 
undertaken using IP pledged under the OCP. 
 
I. The OCP Environment 
Though issues relating to website hosting and design may seem mundane, these 
and other aspects of the “environment” surrounding the Pledge played an important 
role in its planning and launch.  Initially, the OCP was hosted on an independent 
website controlled by a Steering Committee member.  In August, 2020, the site was 
transferred to Creative Commons, which assumed the responsibility for 
“stewardship” of the project.224 Then in [February, 2021], the OCP website was 
transferred to the Program for Information Justice and Intellectual Property (PIJIP) 
at American University Washington College of Law, which currently hosts and 
stewards the project. 
The OCP website includes a number of relatively standard features such as a 
“frequently asked questions” (FAQ) page, news releases and blog posts,225 
information about the organizers, and a list of online resources.  Prior to launch, the 
OCP also contracted for the design of a logo that could be used to generate brand 





The OCP logo 
 
The institutional steward of the OCP maintains a Twitter account for the OCP 
(@OpenCovidPledge), which it uses, in addition to blog posts on the website, to 
disseminate news regarding new pledgors, interactions with other groups, 




225 Much of the public outreach for the OCP, including press releases and news announcements, was 
handled by Creative Commons, first on a volunteer basis, and then as the steward of the OCP from 
September 2020 to February 2021. 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3780850





In addition to pledgors of IP, the OCP sought to attract endorsements from 
organizations that are supportive of the OCP’s mission.  While such organizations 
did not pledge IP (and often control no relevant IP), the accumulation of a large 
number of “Supporters” from around the world both validated the legitimacy of the 
OCP program and demonstrated broad support for its goals among well-respected 
groups. 
As of this writing, there are forty-four OCP Supporters, including academic 
centers,226 advocacy groups, foundations and professional service providers.227 
Supporters are featured on the OCP website with links to their own websites.228  A 
complete list of OCP Supporters is included in Appendix C. 
 
IV.  LAUNCH AND ADOPTION OF THE OPEN COVID PLEDGE 
 
The Open COVID Pledge was “launched” on April 7, 2020, with Intel as its 
first major pledgor.229  Within two weeks, Amazon, Facebook, Hewlett Packard 
Enterprise, IBM, Microsoft, and Sandia National Laboratories also joined the OCP 
with pledges of tens of thousands of additional patents and other IP.230 In May, the 
WHO recognized the OCP in its global Solidarity Call to Action, calling on IP 
holders to help end the pandemic by sharing “relevant knowledge, intellectual 
property and data to enable widescale and worldwide production, distribution and 
use of such technologies and necessary raw materials” through mechanisms 
including the OCP.231 By mid-June, 2020, the OCP had attracted more than thirty 
pledgors with an estimated 500,000 pledged patents. This Part IV analyzes the 
adoption patterns of the OCP and assesses the value of the OCP in fields in which 
adoption has been high and low. 
 
A. Profile of Pledgors and Pledges 
1. Overall Statistics 
As of February 1, 2021, thirty-two entities had formally made the Open COVID 
Pledge (see Appendix C). These included twenty-six corporate entities, four non-
 
 
226 Academic centers are policy-focused centers within academic institutions that do not represent 
the views of their larger institutions or technology licensing offices. 
227 Some professional service firms, such as patent law firm BananaIP based in Bangalore, India, 
offered to perform free legal services for clients who participated in the OCP.  See BananaIP, Free 
Patent Filings For Open COVID Pledge Adopters, Apr. 29, 2020, https://www.bananaip.com/ip-







231 WHO Solidarity Call to Action, supra note 22. 
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profit entities (universities or research institutes) and two U.S. national laboratories. 




Types of Entities Making the Open COVID Pledge 
 
With regard to the IP rights pledged, four entities pledged copyrights and 
twenty-nine pledged patents (with one entity pledging both patents and copyrights).  
Of the patent pledgors, twenty pledged all patents, while nine pledged selected 
patents or patent applications only. 
 
2. Timing of Pledges 
In terms of timing, the large majority of pledgors committed to the OCP during 
the first month after launch, April, 2020. A handful of additional pledgors 
committed in the following two months, with only one pledgor per month in August 





Type of Pledgor (n = 32)
Corp Natl. Lab Non-Profit
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Adoption of the Open COVID Pledge, by Month 
 
This trend does not correlate with the steady rise in COVID-19 cases or 
fatalities worldwide.  Rather, it reflects an initial burst of interest, followed by a 
steady decline in new pledge commitments. There are several possible explanations 
for this trend.   
First, there may be a natural limit to the number of IP holders willing to pledge 
their IP for a cause such as the COVID-19 response.  However, given that only 
thirty-two out of tens of thousands of IP holders have made the Pledge, it seems 
unlikely that the natural limit of pledgors has been reached.   
Second, IP holders may find few benefits to making the Pledge substantially 
after the OCP’s launch.  Entities that joined early enjoyed the publicity of being 
associated with a new endeavor that was attracting attention from the media as well 
as international bodies and governments. It is possible that latecomers, not 
anticipating any significant attention so long after the launch of the OCP, do not 
feel that the benefits of making the Pledge outweigh its potential negative effects 
or even the internal effort required to review it and seek internal management 
approval. 
Third, entities that adopted a “wait and see” approach to the Pledge may have 
concluded, following its debut, that the benefits enjoyed early adopters were not as 
significant as originally anticipated, and that negative effects from not joining did 
not materialize.  As such, for these entities, the cost-benefit balance might continue 
to weigh in favor of not making the Pledge. 
Fourth, IP holders might perceive the possibility of negative publicity from 
making the Pledge so long after OCP’s launch, particularly if the pandemic is close 
to ending.  That is, an entity might not want to be lampooned as a “Johnny come 
lately”, making the Pledge only after it is hardly worth making anymore. 












Pledge Adoption by Month (2020)
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Finally, after a significant initial effort to recruit pledgors and supporters in 
anticipation of the OCP’s launch, the Steering Committee itself flagged in its efforts 
to recruit new pledgors. This decline likely resulted from a combination of 
competing time demands on Steering Committee members, the lack of a permanent 
administrative staff that could take the laboring oar with respect to recruitment 
efforts232 and the lack of a coherent recruitment strategy. In this respect, the 
recruitment difficulties of the OCP bear similarities to those of the earlier EcoPC 
and Defensive Patent License group.233 
 
B. Adoption Trends  
Patterns of adoption began to emerge almost immediately after the launch of 
the OCP.  Organizations in some industry sectors, such as information technology 
(IT), embraced the Pledge in significant numbers, while those in the 
biopharmaceutical sector did not.  This Part IV.B discusses some of the industry-
specific factors and considerations that may have driven, or deterred, adoption of 
the OCP during its first year of operation. 
 
1. Crisis-Critical Products 
Frank Tietze (a Steering Committee member) and co-authors have previously 
identified five categories of product innovation that are critical when responding to 
a major infectious disease outbreak such as COVID-19 (“crisis-critical 
products”).234 These categories include: 
• Vaccines and treatments 
• Diagnostic tests 
• Medical equipment (especially hospital/ICU devices such as 
ventilators) 
• Personal protective equipment (PPE) 
• Digital innovation, including “artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled 
tracking apps for cases and spreaders and epidemic modeling to monitor 
 
 
232 Recruitment of pledgors fell to the personal contacts of key Steering Committee members, as 
well as a handful of student volunteers who eventually redirected their efforts to their studies and 
other activities. 
233 See Contreras, et al., EcoPatent, supra note 51, at 103 (“Most trade associations have dedicated 
personnel for membership development, and enrolling members takes significant time and effort. 
Without these resources, it is not surprising that the EcoPC was unable to recruit a larger body of 
members nor that WBCSD and ELI spent few additional funds for EcoPC recruitment”); Jorge L. 
Contreras, The Evolving Patent Pledge Landscape, CIGI Papers No. 166, Apr. 3, 2018 at 10 (“It is 
possible that the lack of a dedicated membership and recruitment mechanism as part of the DPL has 
disadvantaged it as compared to the [License on Transfer network], just as this absence seems to 
have worked against the success of the EcoPC”). 
234 Tietze, et al., supra note x, at 3. 
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and understand the spread and development of the virus across 
populations” 
Intellectual property in each of these crisis-critical product categories has been 
pledged to the COVID-19 response under the OCP.  The following discussion 
summarizes and offers examples of pledges in each of these categories. 
 
2. Biopharmaceuticals (Vaccines and Cures) 
a. Private Sector 
The biopharmaceutical sector – particularly vaccine development and 
manufacture -- has been among the most visible in the public debate over patents 
and COVID-19.  Not surprisingly, given the large amounts at stake, patent 
assertions and litigation have affected this sector from an early date.235 As a result, 
repeated calls have been made by government officials to open access to vaccine-
related patents.236 
Yet compared to other market sectors, there has been comparatively little 
adoption of the OCP, or any voluntary pledging activity, with respect to IP covering 
COVID-19 vaccines or therapeutics (a few exceptions being the unilateral pledges 
made by AbbVie237 and Moderna,238 and pledges by a number of Japanese firms in 
the biomedical sector239).  Most firms in the biopharmaceutical sector have likewise 
avoided participation in the WHO’s C-TAP pool. 240 
Simple economic forces may be at work here, as firms that anticipate a direct 
and significant windfall from the sale of COVID-19 products to governments and 
health plans may be less inclined to commit their IP to a public cause or to make it 
available to their competitors. In addition, biopharmaceutical firms point to 
legitimate concerns about the quality and safety of products that may be 
 
 
235 See notes 21-22, supra, and accompanying text (describing early concerns over patents in the 
vaccine industry).  See also Hailey Konnath, Pfizer, Regeneron Hit With Patent Suits Over COVID-
19 Tech, LAW360, Oct. 5, 2020. 
236 See Bill de Blasio, Biden's Covid order lets Big Pharma companies waive vaccine patents. They 
must do so, NBC Think, Jan. 29, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/covid-vaccine-
supply-dangerously-low-will-biden-s-executive-order-
ncna1256171?_sm_au_=iVVr8v3NjJF7WPZNvMFckK0232C0F (calling on vaccine developers to 
“follow Moderna’s lead and stand down on its patents” because “[i]n a global pandemic, ‘intellectual 
property’ should not matter. Human lives should.”), David M. Herszenhorn, Charles Michel says 
EU could invoke ‘urgent measures’ in response to vaccine shortfall, POLITICO, Jan. 28, 2021, 
https://www.politico.eu/article/charles-michel-says-eu-could-invoke-urgent-measures-response-
coronavirus-vaccine-shortfall/# (reporting that the President of the European Council suggested that 
the European Union could “force vaccine-makers to share their patents, or other licenses, and take 
other steps to ramp up production of the desperately sought-after vaccines”).  
237 See Part x, supra. 
238 See Part x, supra. 
239 See Part x, supra. 
240 Adam Houldsworth, WHO covid-19 IP pool launches this week without strong pharma support, 
INTELL. ASSET MGT., May 26, 2020 (quoting Thomas Cueni, Director General of the International 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Companies and Associations (IFPMA)). 
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manufactured under open licensing regimes.241 For all of these reasons, it is not 
surprising that companies in the biopharmaceutical sector have had limited 
participation in the OCP and other pledging and pooling initiatives.242 
However, not all vaccine-related initiatives are profit-seeking. The Rapid 
Deployment Vaccine Collaborative (RADVAC), which was formed by researchers 
affiliated with Harvard Medical School, seeks the “rapid development, testing, and 
free and open-source sharing of vaccine designs and essential protocols.”243 
RADVAC freely shares all information on its vaccine designs, production, self-
administration, and testing on its website under the OCP.244 
In addition, a number of large firms that are not directly engaged in the 
biopharmaceutical industry have contributed potentially valuable IP to the 
development of vaccines and therapies targeted at COVID-19.  For example, a 
pledged IBM patent covers the use of cationic polyamines for the treatment of 
viruses.245 Moreover, as described in Part IV.B.6.a, below, numerous firms have 
pledged IP covering artificial intelligence and computational methods for 
enhancing drug discovery, design, testing, manufacture and administration.   
 
b. Universities 
A large amount of biomedical innovation in the U.S. and elsewhere originates 
in academic research institutions, much of which is funded by governments and 
charitable foundations.  Yet no major research institution has yet participated in the 
OCP with respect to biopharmaceutical inventions. The lack of broader OCP 
adoption by research universities has been disappointing, given that universities 
generally have broad public charters that would seem to support the advancement 
of public health.246 
Twenty-four academic research institutions have committed to use the Harvard-
MIT-Stanford COVID-19 Technology Access Framework described in Part 
II.C.3.d, above.247 This Framework, announced on the same day as the Open 
COVID Pledge, shares many of the OCP’s fundamental design features including 
royalty-free licensing of IP related to the COVID-19 response.  While the HMS 
Framework is more administratively burdensome than the OCP, in that it appears 
 
 
241 Id. (quoting Corey Salsberg, head of IP affairs for Novartis). 
242 This being said, a number of vaccine manufacturers have made other public commitments 
relating to product access and pricing during the COVID-19 pandemic.  See Adam Houldsworth, 
Your guide to covid-19 vaccine stakeholders’ IP strategies, INTELL. ASSET MGT., Nov. 19, 2020. 
243 https://radvac.org 
244 Id. 
245 U.S. Pat. No. 9,682,100 (“Cationic polyamines for treatment of viruses”) (assigned to IBM). 
246 See Natl. Acad. Sci., Comm. on Management of Univ. Intell. Prop., Managing University 
Intellectual Property in the Public Interest 24 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds. 2010) 
(“the first goal of university technology transfer involving (intellectual property) is the expeditious 
and wide dissemination of university-generated technology for the public good”). 
247 In addition, Oxford University announced a licensing framework similar to that of HMS. See 
Part II.C.2.d, supra. 
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to require bilateral, signed licensing agreements between participating universities 
and licensees, and also imposes downstream pricing constraints on licensees, such 
arrangements have yielded beneficial results, for example, in the Medicines Patent 
Pool.  It is not known how many, if any, licenses have been executed under the 
HMS Framework. 
But even with these programs, the vast majority of academic research 
institutions worldwide248 have declined to make any pledge whatsoever with 
respect to their intellectual property.  There are several possible explanations for 
this lack of interest. First, some universities may genuinely believe that the granting 
of exclusive licenses to patents covering fundamental discoveries is most likely to 
result in the commercialization of products based on those discoveries.  This may 
explain Oxford University’s reportedly exclusive license of vaccine technology to 
AstraZeneca,249 and was cited by a representative of at least one major U.S. 
research university with whom the author spoke in connection with the OCP.250 
 Alternatively, like private firms, universities may wish to maximize revenue 
generation from their intellectual property portfolios. While such a profit-
maximizing motivation may seem incongruous with the public missions of many 
universities, it has been well-documented over the past several decades.251  
 
c. UAEM and Free the Vaccine 
One of the most heartening, and unexpected, developments arising from the 
release of the OCP was its adoption in June 2020 by the student activist group 
Universities Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM).  UAEM got its start more 
than twenty years ago during the controversy over Yale University’s exclusive 
license of the AIDS treatment stavudine to Bristol-Myers-Squibb (BMS). Student 
protests helped to persuade the university administration to require BMS to 
distribute the drug, for which Yale earned approximately $40 million per year, at 
substantially reduced prices in Africa.252 
 
 
248 The QS World University Rankings for 2021 rank 1,003 research universities. 
https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2021 (visited Jan. 
31, 2021). 
249 See Part II.C.2.d, supra. 
250 Telephone conversation between the author and a representative of a U.S. university, Jun. 30, 
2020. 
251 See, e.g., DANIEL S. GREENBERG, SCIENCE FOR SALE: THE PERILS, REWARDS, AND DELUSIONS 
OF CAMPUS CAPITALISM (2007); JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC., (2005), Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg & Robert Cook-Deegan, Universities: The Fallen Angels of Bayh-Dole? 147 DAEDELUS 
76, 86 (2018), Jorge L. Contreras, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics: A 
Critical Reassessment, 27 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 1, 45 (2020). 
252 See Julian Borger & Sarah Boseley, Campus revolt challenges Yale over $40m Aids drug, 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 13, 2001, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/mar/13/education.highereducation; After an uproar, 
price of AIDS drug falls in Africa, YALE MED., Spr. 2001 at 4, https://medicine.yale.edu/news/yale-
medicine-magazine/ym_sp01_348411_43933_v1.pdf. 
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During the summer of 2020, UAEM turned its attention to the COVID-19 crisis 
and the anticipated cost of the vaccines under development.  It created a campaign 
known as “Free the Vaccine for COVID-19” which advocates the creation of a free 
“People’s Vaccine” based on publicly-funded research.253  In its calls to action, Free 
the Vaccine promoted the Open COVID Pledge as the preferred mechanism for 
securing public rights to develop and manufacture such vaccines: 
We call for universities, organizations, and companies receiving 
public funds for COVID research to sign the Open COVID Pledge, 
a legal commitment to open licensing the intellectual property 
needed for the cure.254 
The principal focus of UAEM’s and Free the Vaccine’s advocacy was the 
university community, where most of its members were students.255  They 
organized specific initiatives to encourage universities including Vanderbilt, 
Arizona State, University of California and Georgetown256 to adopt the OCP and 
contribute their patented technologies toward the creation of a public vaccine.  
Members of the Steering Committee participated in meetings with UAEM and 
university representatives to discuss the legal specifics of the OCP.   
To date, these efforts have not resulted in further pledges by universities. 
However, unlike medical equipment, vaccine manufacture and distribution is still 
in a relatively early phase, and additional pressure to make vaccines more widely 
available at lower prices will likely continue, particularly with respect to the 
developing world.  The same can be said for therapeutics targeting COVID-19, 
another area in which grassroots activism can potentially help to broaden access 
and lower prices.  In both of these areas, it is possible that continued pressure from 
groups such as UAEM will persuade more research universities to commit their IP 
to the COVID-19 response. 
 
 
253 UAEM, UAEM Activists Launch Free The Vaccine Campaign, Apr. 11, 2020, 
https://www.uaem.org/free_vaccine_camp 
254 Free the Vaccine for COVID-19, Support a People’s Vaccine, https://freethevaccine.org/why-
sign-on/?fbclid=IwAR2Z0eprv3JRltqXzK-Mnh8QN1-
DZQs3MnERlvYG0jM6XsEmFZIVF1wkwtU 
255 See UAEM, Open COVID Pledge, https://www.uaem.org/opencovid_pledge 
256 UAEM, List of Institutions, https://www.uaem.org/list_of_institutions 
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Patents covering COVID-19 diagnostic tests gained prominence early in March, 
2020, when Labrador Diagnostics asserted patents that its parent Fortress 
Investments acquired from defunct blood testing firm Theranos against diagnostic 
test makers.257 As discussed above, Fortress and Labrador eventually bowed to 
public pressure and withdrew those suits, instead pledging not to assert their patents 
against COVID-19 diagnostics. 
Numerous other pledges relating to diagnostic equipment, testing and methods  
have been made through the OCP.  Intel, for example, holds a patent covering 
methods for detecting target bioanalytes using ferromagnetic microdisks.258  IBM 
holds and has pledged several relevant patents, including one claiming a method 
for detecting a nucleic acid (e.g., DNA or RNA) sequence using a cellular phone, 
and a pending patent application claiming a microfluidic device with programmable 
verification features259 – a technology similar to that allegedly developed by 
Theranos.  Sandia National Laboratory, which holds a number of patents covering 
 
 
257 See Part x, supra. 
258 U.S. Pat. No. 7,973,398 (“Resonant magnetic disks for bioanalyte detection”).  For a discussion 
of the potential of magnetic nanoparticles in diagnosing COVID-19, see Wudan Yan & David 
Schneider, The Race for a Here and Now COVID-19 Test, IEEE SPECTRUM, Oct. 2020, at 61, 64. 
259 U.S. Pat. App. No. US2018372765 A1. 
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the detection of proteins and other organic molecules,260 has also pledged IP 
relating to the design of a “low-cost, easy-to-use outdoor shelter for healthcare 
workers to conduct safer COVID-19 drive-up or walk-up testing.”261  Together, 
these pledges represent a meaningful body of technology that can be useful in the 
development of new diagnostic tests for COVID-19, the improvement of existing 
diagnostic tests, and the efficient manufacture and supply of diagnostic test kits 
with reduced concerns of patent infringement. 
 
4. Medical Equipment  
As noted in the Introduction, the lack of hospital ventilators and ventilator 
replacement parts during the early weeks of the pandemic was one of the 
precipitating factors that led to calls for greater access to proprietary IP.  The 
unilateral Medtronic and Smiths Group pledges with respect to ventilator 
equipment were significant steps toward opening these markets to broader 
participation.  The Open Ventilator System Initiative (OVSI), an OCP participant, 
is a UK-based project that has designed a portable and affordable ventilator device 
for deployment in low- and middle-income countries.262 With these pledges, 
significant progress has been made in the area of hospital ventilator equipment. 
IP covering number of other medical products and devices relevant to COVID-
19 has also been pledged.  These products include simple yet innovative devices 
such as a nasal forcep swab for sample collection263 and a plastic device for spiking 
IV bags.264 These devices, produced by smaller entities, may be protected by a 
single patent application.  Yet by joining the OCP alongside some of the largest 
corporations in the world, these entities highlight their products in a favorable light. 
 
5. Personal protective equipment (PPE) 
Shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE) such as masks and face 
shields became acute during the early months of the pandemic and have continued 
to plague hospitals, clinics and testing sites.  Both Sandia National Laboratory and 
the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) were early contributors of PPE 
intellectual property to the fight against COVID-19.  Sandia analyzed 200,000 
designs for face coverings and 900 designs for face shields made using commonly 
available materials and made its findings publicly available.265  JPL published the 
digital design files for four different 3D printed respirators.266 And a small business, 
 
 
260 See, e.g., U.S. Pat. Nos. 9,546,887 (“Multiaxis sensing using metal organic frameworks”),  
8,163,154 (“Method for voltage-gated protein fractionation”), 7,527,977 (“Protein detection 
system”).  
261 https://ip.sandia.gov/technology.do/techID=259 
262 See https://ovsi.org. 
263 NJIT, https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/05/20/njit-forcep-swab-for-covid-19-testing/ 
264 HMJ Medical – Spike Assist, https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/05/19/hmj-medical-spike-assist/ 
265 https://ip.sandia.gov/technology.do/techID=258 
266 https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/05/20/nasa-jet-propulsion-laboratory/  
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ProBuccal, pledged its intellectual property in an oral bioaerosol shield for dental 
applications.267 
Though not as highly publicized as PPE, other technologies have become 
important for preventing and containing the spread of infection.  The use of 
ultraviolet radiation as a powerful disinfecting agent has attracted significant 
attention during the COVID-19 pandemic.268 A pledged IBM technology sanitizes 
touchscreen devices using ultraviolet light after use.269 In a slightly different vein, 
recent patents and patent applications held by Microsoft270 and Intel,271  
respectively, cover the authentication of a user’s identity using contactless gestures 
in three-dimensional space (i.e., avoiding the need for direct contact between an 
individual and a device). Technologies such as these are being utilized with 
increasing frequency as concern over contamination and the spread of contagion 
through human touch remains high. 
 
6. Digital Innovation 
Both in terms of number of pledgors and number of patents, the greatest uptake 
of the OCP has been in the information technology (IT) sector.  Large multinational 
firms such as Intel, IBM, Microsoft, Facebook, Fujitsu, Uber, Mitsubishi Electric, 
Amazon and SAP have each made thousands or tens of thousands of patents 
available through the OCP.  Any accurate inventory of the close to a half million 
patents pledged in this area is impossible. However, some of the industry sub-
sectors into which such patents fall are summarized below: 
 
a. Biopharmaceutical research tools 
Over the past decade, drug discovery and development have become 
increasingly dependent on computational methods and machine learning.272 A 
number of patents covering artificial intelligence systems and algorithms for 
computational drug discovery and design (including vaccine design) have been 





268 See Mark Anderson, The Ultra-Violet Offense, IEEE SPECTRUM, Oct. 2020, at 51. 
269 U.S. Pat. No. 9,772,714 (“Touch input device with pathogen transmission mitigation”). 
270 U.S. Pat. No. 8,845,431 (“Shape trace gesturing”). 
271 U.S. Pat. App. No. 16/716,983 (Gesture-Based Signature Authentication). 
272 See Emily Waltz, AI Takes its Best Shot, IEEE SPECTRUM, Oct. 2020, at 25, 26 (machine learning 
systems and computational analysis assist researchers in understanding virus structure, immune 
response, choosing vaccine elements, tracking virus mutations and understanding experimental 
data), Megan Scudellari, Automating Antivirals, IEEE SPECTRUM, Oct. 2020, at 45 (predicting that 
AI and automation will reduce drug discovery cycles from five years to six months). 
273 See, e.g., U.S. Pat. No. 8,452,541 (“Vaccine Design Methodology”), U.S. Pat. App. No 
US2006160070 A1 (“Association-based epitome design”). 
274 See, e.g., U.S. Pat. App. No. 2019/0179A1 (“Method and Device For Searching Binding site of 
target molecule”) (assigned to Fujitsu). 
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particularly relevant Microsoft patent covers the use of machine learning 
algorithms to facilitate the assembly of vaccine cocktails for pathogens, such as 
HIV, that evolve quickly under immune pressure of the host.275 And a recent IBM 
patent claims methods for identifying clinical trial site locations based on 
epidemiological and demographic factors.276 
In addition, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise has pledged its substantial portfolio of 
IP relating to data handling and exchange in cryo-electron microscopy systems, 
important research tools for drug discovery and development.277 With respect to the 
administration of therapeutics, IBM has pledged IP covering a computerized 
decision support tool for optimizing long-term drug therapy.278 The fact that these 
advanced digital innovations have been pledged may enable firms in the 
biopharmaceutical sector to research and develop COVID-19 vaccines and 
therapeutics more effectively and rapidly, without exposure to patent infringement. 
 
b. Contact tracing and epidemiology 
The rapid spread of COVID-19, its long latency period, and the uncertainty 
surrounding its precise vectors of transmission has led to a need for reliable and 
pervasive methods of modeling, predicting and tracing the spread of contagion.279  
So-called “contact tracing” applications, which allow users to track the individuals 
with whom they have had contact, have helped epidemiologists to understand the 
nature of the disease and its spread.280 
Numerous patents claiming contact tracing methods and technologies, as well 
as epidemiological modeling techniques, have been issued.  One such contract 
tracing patent held by Utah-based Blyncsy, Inc.281 was the subject of a successful 
public call for prior art by Unified Patents, a participant in the OCP.282 Unified 
alleged that Blyncsy was asserting this patent against firms developing and 
deploying contact tracing technology for COVID-19. 
 
 
275 U.S. Pat. No. 8,478,535 (“Systems and methods that utilize machine learning algorithms to 
facilitate assembly of aids vaccine cocktails”). 
276 U.S. Pat. No. 10,515,099 (“Medical clinical trial site identification”). 
277 https://www.hpe.com/us/en/newsroom/blog-post/2020/04/hpe-opens-its-patents-to-fight-covid-
19.html. 
278 U.S. Pat. App. No. 2019/163877 A1 (“Decision support for effective long-term drug therapy”). 
279 See Matthew Hutson, The Mess Behind the Models, IEEE SPECTRUM, Oct. 2020, at 31 (discussing 
shortcomings in current disease and epidemic modeling algorithms). 
280 Jeremy Hsu, The Dilemma of Contract-Tracing Apps, IEEE SPECTRUM, Oct. 2020, at 56. 
281 U.S. Pat. No. 10,198,779 (“Tracking Proximity Relationships and Uses Thereof”). 
282 See Unified Patents, $2,000 for Blyncsy Prior Art, Oct. 21, 2020, 
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/insights/2020/2000-blyncsy. Unified Patents is a member-
supported organization that, among other things, seeks to invalidate patents that have been asserted 
by PAEs through inter partes review (IPR) proceedings at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(PTAB).  See Unified Patents, FAQ, https://www.unifiedpatents.com/faq.  As part of this effort, 
Unified conducts competitions with cash prizes for those identifying prior art that can be used to 
invalidate such patents.  See Unified Patents, Patroll – Contests, 
https://patroll.unifiedpatents.com/contests (visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
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Notwithstanding such assertions, a significant number of patents, patent 
applications and other IP relating to contract tracing and epidemiological modeling 
have been pledged under the OCP by firms including apheris AI,283 IBM,284 
Mitsubishi Electric285 and Microsoft.286 These contributions, together with the prior 
art identified by Unified Patents, are likely to provide significantly enhanced 
freedom to operate in the area of contract tracing technology. 
 
c. Infrastructure and logistics  
Though seldom making headlines, the COVID-19 pandemic has placed 
unexpected strains on global physical and network infrastructures, supply chains 
and transportation systems.  As governments and institutions struggle to cope with 
aging systems, new technologies are being deployed to ensure the rapid, safe and 
efficient allocation of resources across physical spaces. In many cases, these 
technologies are covered by IP that has been pledged through the OCP. 
For example, IBM, which has pledged all of its patents under the OCP, has 
developed significant technology to secure the medical product supply chain, 
particularly for compounds (such as vaccines) requiring refrigeration.287  Hewlett-
Packard Enterprise, which has also pledged its patents under the OCP, has deployed 
wireless technology and location-based services to enable pop-up clinics and 
hospitals, including at least one shipboard “floating” hospital in Italy.288 And 
another pledgor, Mitsubishi Electric, has contributed IP relating to the efficient 




283 See apheris AI, GmbH, Use Cases, https://www.apheris.com/usecases (describing “Covid-19 
Privacy-preserving frameworks for contact tracing applications”). 
284 See, e.g., U.S. Pat. Nos. 7,426,557 (“System, method, and service for inducing a pattern of 
communication among various parties”), 9,659,367 (“Head mounted video and touch detection for 
healthcare facility”), and U.S. Pat. App. Nos. 2018/052970 (“Tracking pathogen exposure”), 
2018/0165419 (“Biometric disease growth prediction”). 
285 See, e.g., U.S. Pat. Nos. 10,514,437 (“Device localization using RSS based path loss exponent 
estimation”), 10,425,910 (“Localization using Millimeter Wave Communication Signals”), 
9,282,531 (“Method and system for localization of a device in an enclosed environment based on 
received signal strength levels”), 8,054,226 (“Method for Estimating Location of Nodes in Wireless 
Networks”), 7,729,659 (“Method for signaling quality of range estimates in UWB devices”).  See 
also https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/08/07/mitsubishi-electric-wireless-localization-for-contact-
tracing/. 
286 See https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/05/19/microsoft-bing/ (describing “A dataset of 
anonymized Bing queries relating to the COVID pandemic, useful for research on the spread and 
containment of the pandemic…”) 





289 U.S. Pat. App. No. 2018/0103116 (“Systems and methods for resource allocation for 
management systems”).  
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Efficiently routing emergency vehicles through traffic is particularly important 
during spikes in demand. One pledged AT&T patent application covers methods 
for optimally routing ambulances and other emergency vehicles to hospitals.290 A 
patent pledged by Uber allows drivers to select routes based on safety conditions, 
which can be particularly relevant for families with children or drivers wishing to 
avoid congested or crowded areas during pandemic conditions.291 
 
d. Information reliability 
One highly publicized development that has emerged from the COVID-19 
pandemic is the spread of misinformation about the disease and its prevention and 
treatment.  Much of this misinformation is spread via social media, and numerous 
firms operating in the IT space have developed methods for assessing the reliability 
and accuracy of information posted to social media accounts. For example, 
Facebook has developed methods for automatically generating and collecting 
contextual information about posts, including credibility indicators, additional 
content and statistical information, and displaying this information for users.292 
Microsoft has also developed methods for using credibility-related data in 
conjunction with servicing web requests such as a search queries.293 And IBM has 
developed methods for aggregating data from multiple sources to validate incidents 
reported via social media,294 and also for measuring the degree of trust that a 
recipient should place in an online message.295  The patents and patent applications 
underlying these and many other technologies for increasing the accuracy and 
reliability of public information have been pledged under the OCP. 
 
C. Creating an Open Innovation Landscape 
As discussed in Part III.A, above, patent pledging efforts will seldom, if ever, 
result in the complete elimination of IP risks for technology developers or users.  
Even when efforts are closely coordinated by all principal developers of a particular 
technology, there remains a risk that “outsiders” will emerge to assert patents 
reading on a particular technology. Nevertheless, the clearance of even some level 
of IP risk can encourage users to enter new markets that they otherwise might not 
have entered.  This possibility is enhanced if prominent IP holders have made their 
 
 
290 U.S. Pat. App. No. 2019/0197438 (“System and method for optimally routing ambulances and 
other vehicles in-route to hospitals”).  
291 U.S. Pat. No. 10,563,994 (“Safe routing for navigation systems”). 
292 U.S. Pat. App. No. 2019/0163794 (“Contextual Information for Determining Credibility of 
Social-Networking Posts”).  
293 U.S. Pat. App. No. 2012/296918 (“Credibility information in returned web results”). 
294 U.S. Pat. App. No. 2018/253814 (“ System and method for incident validation and ranking using 
human and non-human data sources”). 
295 U.S. Pat. No. 10,051,069 (“Action based trust modeling”). 
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IP broadly available to users in connection with a common cause such as pandemic 
response.   
Table 2, below, offers an (admittedly subjective and non-quantitative) 
assessment of the adoption of the OCP by providers of the five crisis-critical 
product categories discussed in Part B, based on a three-tier assessment (low, 
medium, high) of the quantity of IP pledged in each category.  In addition, Table 2 
includes an assessment by category of the IP pledges made in such category when 
combining the OCP with the other unilateral and collective pledges described in 
Part II.C.   
 
Table 2 – Pledges of Crisis-Critical Product IP 
Product category Pledged through 
OCP 
Pledged through all 
Pledges 
Biopharma Low Low-Medium 
Diagnostics Low Medium 





Digital innovation High High 
 
As shown in Table 2, there is wide variation in pledging activity among product 
categories. The lowest degree of activity has occurred with respect to 
biopharmaceutical products such as vaccines and treatments, most likely due to the 
substantial economic factors discussed in Part IV.B.2. Vaccine-related pledges such 
as those by Moderna and RADVAC could facilitate the development and 
production of vaccines by alternate sources, though the majority of technologies in 
this space remain fully protected by proprietary rights.   
At the other end of the spectrum, a significant amount of IP has been pledged 
in the areas of PPE and digital innovation.  With respect to PPE, pledged IP appears 
sufficient to enable the manufacture of respirators and other forms of equipment 
without significant risk of infringement – an achievement that has an immediate  
potential benefit to society.   
Likewise, numerous categories of digital innovation appear to be substantially 
“opened” to innovation and product development through pledging mechanisms.  
This effect is particularly striking in areas such as contact tracing, in which pledges 
by leading multinational firms signal an openness to market entry that should be 
attractive to innovators in this area.  Moreover, even if innovators are unaware of 
specific pledged IP, or even the existence of such pledges, the resulting lack of IP 
enforcement in these market segments should, itself, encourage further 
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development and innovation that might otherwise be chilled in an atmosphere of 
active IP enforcement.296 
The broad nature of most OCP pledges, and its public licensing structure, 
further contribute to the open innovation landscape that is fosters.  That is, within 
fields in which OCP (and related) pledge coverage is high, potential users of 
pledged IP need not identify specific patents or copyrights that they wish to use, as 
required by the various university COVID-19 frameworks described in Part II.C.3.  
Such an identification exercise is both time consuming and technically difficult, 
and requires an investigation of each pledgor’s IP portfolio with a degree of 
expertise that may be unavailable to many potential users. The OCP’s public license 
structure also eliminates the need to identify individual IP licensors and negotiate 
licenses with each of them, another time consuming and potentially daunting 
exercise for a small entity not inured to the legal culture of the U.S.   
Thus, while quantitative measurement of the precise impact of IP pledges on 
markets is difficult, particularly given the large number of patents pledged under 
the OCP and similar programs,297 there is cause to be optimistic that such pledges 
may be having an effect, direct or indirect, on the willingness of innovators to invest 
in the development of products that can contribute to the containment of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. This “opening” of fields to innovation and new market entry 
is among the principal benefits of the OCP. 
 
V.  SUSTAINABILITY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
Pledges made under the OCP are irrevocable and will survive notwithstanding 
the fate of the OCP organization itself.  Nevertheless, as shown by the experience 
of the EcoPC, it is desirable for such pledge communities to continue to recruit new 
pledgors and to promote and disseminate information about IP that is available for 
use.  The long-term success of the OCP thus depends, in part, on its continued 
operation and expansion.  This Part V briefly explores the prospects for the OCP’s 
continued operation as well as potential future directions. 
 
A. Stewardship and Financial Security 
One of the principal failings of the EcoPC was its lack of a committed 
organizational steward.  While the project received significant support and attention 
from its corporate sponsors prior to and immediately after its launch, its ongoing 
operations were subsequently delegated to two non-profit organizations that did not 
commit substantial personnel or financial resources to its upkeep or expansion.298  
 
 
296 See Chien & Hastings, supra note 219 (referring to OCP as “a useful non-assertion covenant that 
helps to clear the path for innovation”). 
297 See Part V.E, infra. 
298 See Contreras, et al., EcoPatent, supra note 51, at 102-03. 
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As a result, no new members were recruited, and no new patents were pledged, 
during the last five years of its existence.  The host organizations were not to blame 
for allowing the project to languish, as their assumption of the Commons came with 
no financial assistance from its corporate members.299 Thus, their activity was 
limited primarily to hosting and maintenance of the Commons web site, but little 
was done to expand membership or disseminate information about patents that were 
made available under the pledge. 
With this experience in mind, the Steering Committee carefully considered the 
ongoing stewardship of the OCP from its inception. As noted in Part III.I, 
responsibility for hosting the OCP website was transferred from an individual 
Steering Committee member to Creative Commons in August, 2020, and then to 
the PIJIP program at American University in [February, 2021].  Each of these 
transitions was intended to entrust the ongoing stewardship of the project to an 
entity with goals and a mission aligned with those of the OCP. 
Nevertheless, as the example of the EcoPC demonstrates, providing more than 
a minimal level of services is difficult without a reliable source of funding.  While 
the OCP made efforts at fundraising during the summer and fall of 2020, these 
efforts, undertaken during the height of the pandemic, did not yield meaningful 
financial contributions. Nevertheless, it is hoped that additional attempts to raise 
funds for the ongoing maintenance and expansion of the project will come to 
fruition in the future. 
 
B. Community 
One of the original goals of the OCP was to create a community of users making 
beneficial use of pledged IP.  Such communities can be valuable channels for 
information dissemination.  They can both “spread the word” about potential uses 
of the IP, and give users an opportunity to share know-how and experiences 
concerning practical aspects of that use. It is hoped that Creative Commons, which 
has established online communities and chapters around the world, may facilitate 
the formation of these user communities. 
 
C. Internationalization 
In October, 2020, Creative Commons led an effort to translate the OCP into the 
six official languages of the United Nations: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 
Russian, and Spanish.300 These translations, which are available on the OCP 
website,301 are intended to make the Pledge accessible and understandable to 
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activities could include translating the OCP into additional languages, as well as 




Arabic and (Simplified) Chinese Translations of the Open COVID Pledge 
 
D. Integration with Complementary Efforts 
The OCP is only one of several coordinated efforts around the world that is 
intended to facilitate the pledging and contribution of IP to the COVID-19 response.  
Both the Japanese Open COVID Declaration and the WHO’s COVID Technology 
Access Pool (C-TAP) have also achieved some success in meeting these goals.  It 
is thus important that such efforts expand their coordination and cooperation, 
particularly in the area of enhancing public information about IP that has been made 
available for use.  
 
E. Measuring Impact 
One of the principal shortcomings of the EcoPC was its failure to track or report 
on the use of pledged IP.302 This failure made the case for further contributions 
weak, and eventually contributed to the discontinuation of the project.303  
Accordingly, the OCP has, from the outset, recognized the need to understand and 
communicate how pledged IP is used.   
Unfortunately, the task of measuring the use of IP when users are not required 
to enter into bilateral licensing agreements, register with IP holders or even identify 
 
 
302 See Contreras, et al., EcoPatent, supra note 51, at x. 
303 Id. 
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themselves publicly, is difficult.304  In addition, unlike the EcoPC, which had just 
over 240 pledged patents, the OCP has close to 500,000, most of which are not 
directly relevant to the purpose of the pledge.  Thus, using forward citation analysis 
to determine the value and subsequent use of pledged patents, as researchers did 
with the EcoPC, is not likely to be illuminating. These difficulties are compounded 
by the fact that counterfactuals are lacking – while the OCP seeks to create an open 
innovation landscape around COVID-19, it is not possible to know how much 
innovation or development would have occurred without the pledges that have been 
made.  For all of these reasons, quantitative tracking of use of pledged patents may 
not be feasible.  However, the Steering Committee is currently considering ways to 
assess user take-up of pledged IP through direct community outreach and 
consultation with user groups.   
 
F. Extensibility of the OCP beyond COVID-19 
While the OCP was developed as a direct response to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the IP pledging framework that it establishes is not unique to COVID-19.  Rather, 
the OCP provides a lightweight, legally enforceable mechanism for the coordinated 
pledging of intellectual property rights within a defined scope and for a limited 
period.  As such, the OCP may be a useful model for the response to future public 
health emergencies in which intellectual property rights may constrain research, 
development or the supply of crisis-critical products. 
Such an IP-sharing framework may not, however, be suitable for addressing all 
public health crises.  For example, there are many devastating health conditions, 
such as cancer and heart disease, with far higher mortality rates than COVID-19.  
Yet broad IP-sharing mechanisms may not be well-suited to addressing conditions 
such as these.  One of the defining characteristics of COVID-19 and other disease 
outbreaks is the strain that they unexpectedly place on existing resources, 
infrastructure, manufacturing capacity and supply.  IP-sharing can help to alleviate 
bottlenecks in the supply chain by authorizing additional producers to enter the 
market and to meet sudden spikes in demand for critical products.  Thus, while 
there are innumerable societal challenges associated with chronic health conditions 
– cost, reimbursement, unequal access and the like – broad IP sharing mechanisms 
that are effective to increase the supply of critical products may not be the ideal 
solutions for these public health issues. 
Another looming health crisis is posed by climate change.  Limited IP pledging 
efforts, including the EcoPC,305 have been undertaken in this area for some time, 
yet none has made available significant amounts of IP.  Climate change poses many 
daunting challenges -- technological, social and political -- and it is not clear 
 
 
304 Understanding how particular patents cover particular products is challenging and complex, even 
when the patents and products are known.  See Besen & Meurer, 2005. 
305 See Contreras, et al., EcoPatent, supra note 51. 
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whether IP is currently blocking or promoting progress toward their solution.306  
Moreover, it is not clear that a generalized pledging framework would achieve 
meaningful gains when issues are tied to local conditions (sea rise, drought, storms), 
require substantial services, know-how and technical expertise to address, and do 
not lend themselves to commoditized solutions that are usable by large segments of 
the affected populations.307 Thus, the adaptation of IP pledging frameworks to such 
future challenges will require careful consideration of the specific design 
requirements and principles suggested by those challenges.  For example, Reynolds 
et al. have proposed a research commons for solar climate engineering, combining 
a commitment to data sharing with an IP pledge that could be subject to royalties.308 
Thus, even if the OCP is not adaptable wholesale to future crises, it is hoped that 
its design and features may help to inform future efforts to coordinate the public IP 




The Open COVID Pledge was conceived as a legal framework to facilitate the 
voluntary contribution of intellectual property rights to the COVID-19 response.  It 
was modeled on successful public licensing structures previously developed by the 
open source software community, Creative Commons and other pledge 
communities, and sought to extend the gains made by a number of unilateral 
pledges made early during the COVID-19 pandemic.  In this respect, the OCP 
sought to offer a lightweight alternative to direct governmental intervention through 
compulsory licensing and to administratively complex patent pools. 
The public response to the launch of the OCP was both heartening and 
instructive.  A large number of patents – approaching 500,000 – were pledged under 
the OCP within a short period of time. However, the willingness of IP holders to 
make pledges varied considerably by market segment.  At one end of the spectrum, 
few pledges were made with respect to biopharmaceutical products such as 
vaccines and treatments, most likely due to the substantial economic windfalls that 
await the successful producers of those products. In this area, more direct 
governmental intervention may be required to encourage IP holders to make their 
IP more broadly available to expand access to lifesaving vaccines and therapies.   
At the other end of the spectrum, however, a significant amount of IP has been 
pledged in the areas of PPE and digital innovation, and to a lesser degree in the 
areas of diagnostics and medical devices.  Pledges that have been made to date 
 
 
306 See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Government Choices In Innovation Funding (With Reference To Climate 
Change, 62 EMORY LAW J. 1087–1157 (2013)., Joy Y. Xiang, Addressing Climate Change: 
Domestic Innovation, International Aid and Collaboration,  5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 1 
(2016). 
307 See Reynolds, et al, supra note 51, at 54-56 (discussing importance of trade secrets in climate-
related innovation). 
308 Id. at 101-06. 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3780850





through the OCP and other mechanisms have already enabled the development and 
manufacture of hospital ventilators and replacement parts, respirators, and a variety 
of other medical tools and devices.  In addition, very large quantities of IP covering 
digital innovation have been pledged for public use, including biopharmaceutical 
discovery tools, contact tracing methodologies, disease modeling algorithms, 
emergency response systems, supply chain enhancements, and social media 
mechanisms for ensuring the accuracy of information disseminated to the public. 
The participation of multiple leading multinationals in this effort signals an 
openness to market entry that should be attractive to innovators in a broad range of 
technology markets.  Moreover, even if innovators are unaware of specific pledged 
IP, or even the existence of such pledges, the resulting lack of IP enforcement in 
these market segments should, itself, encourage further development and 
innovation that might otherwise be chilled in an atmosphere of active IP 
enforcement.   
Thus, while precisely measuring the impact of IP pledges on markets is 
difficult, particularly given the large pledges made under the OCP and similar 
programs, there is cause to be optimistic that such pledges may be having an effect  
on the willingness of innovators to invest in the development and supply of products 
that will contribute to the containment and eventual eradication of the COVID-19 
pandemic. This “opening” of fields to innovation and new market entry is among 
the principal benefits of the OCP. 
Regrettably, however, COVID-19 is not likely to be the last public health 
emergency to afflict the world.  Future pandemics, as well as global climate change 
and its associated health impacts, will create an even greater demand for access to 
innovative, lifesaving technologies. It is hoped that the OCP, which was carefully 
designed to balance the competing interests of broad user adoption with 
acceptability to IP holders in a lightweight and legally-enforceable manner, may be 
a useful model for future IP sharing endeavors.   
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APPENDIX A - OPEN COVID LICENSE  
 
Open COVID License - Patent and Copyright (OCL-PC) 1.1 
 
Having made the Open COVID Pledge, we (the “Pledgor”), in order to speed 
the development and dissemination of the technologies needed to end the COVID-
19 Pandemic and mitigate the effects of the disease, grant the license described 
below. Our intent in doing so is to advance the shared cause of ending the COVID-
19 Pandemic, and we do so without any expectation of consideration or 
compensation, and with knowledge of the rights we are licensing. 
1. GRANT AND SCOPE 
The Pledgor grants to every person and entity that wishes to accept it, a non-
exclusive, royalty-free, worldwide, fully paid-up license (without the right to 
sublicense) under Pledgor’s patents and copyrights that we have the right to license 
(the “Licensed IP”) to make, have made, use, sell, and import any patented 
invention, and reproduce, adapt, translate, distribute, perform, display, modify, 
create derivative works of and otherwise exploit any copyrights, solely for the 
purpose of diagnosing, preventing, containing, and treating COVID-19. 
2. TIME LIMITATION 
This license is effective as of December 1, 2019 and lasts until one year after 
the World Health Organization declares the COVID-19 Pandemic to have ended, 
but in any event not beyond January 1, 2023, unless otherwise extended by the 
Pledgor.  
3. REGULATORY EXCLUSIVITY 
The Pledgor will not assert any regulatory exclusivity against any entity or 
individual for use of the Licensed IP in accordance with the license granted in 
Section 1, and we will not seek injunctive or regulatory relief to prevent any entity 
or individual from doing so. 
4. DEFENSIVE SUSPENSION 
The license and non-assertion covenant granted above shall automatically be 
suspended, and the Pledgor shall be free to assert the Licensed IP against the 
licensee, if the licensee or any entity affiliated with the licensee threatens or initiates 
a suit or legal proceeding alleging the infringement of any patent or other 
intellectual property right against the Pledgor or any entity affiliated with the 
Pledgor. 
5. NO WARRANTY 
The license granted herein is “AS IS” without any warranties, express or 
implied.  
All copyright and related rights in the Open COVID License are waived via 
CC0. 
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APPENDIX B – OCP PLEDGORS AND SUPPORTERS  
 
PLEDGORS, DATE AND LICENSE TYPE 
Pledgor License License 
Category 
Date Rights Licensed 
Agnisys OCL-P v1.1 OCL Standard 9-May-20  All patents 
Allen Institute for AI Custom OCL 
Compatible 
25-Jun-20  Select patents 
Amazon OC-P v1.1 OCL Standard 20-Apr-20  All patents 
apheris AI GmBH Apache 2.0 OCL 
Compatible 
8-Apr-20  Select patents 
AT&T OCL-P v1.1 OCL Standard 30-Apr-20  All patents 
Bow Market OCL-PC 
v1.0 





OCL Standard 7-Apr-20 All patents 
Facebook OCL-P v1.1 OCL Standard 20-Apr-20  All patents 
Fujitsu Limited Custom OCL 
Compatible 
12-May-20  All patents 
Hewlett Packard 
Enterprise 
OCL-P v1.1 OCL Standard 20-Apr-20  All patents 
HMJ Medical LLC OCL-PC 
v1.0 
OCL Standard 8-Apr-20  All patents 




20-Apr-20  All patents 
Intel Corporation Custom OCL 
Compatible 
7-Apr-20  All patents 
KINETIC OCL-P v1.1 OCL Standard 22-Oct-20  Select patents 
Leonardo Company Custom OCL 
Compatible 
16-Jun-20  Select patents 
McKinsey & 
Company, Inc. 
Custom OCL Alternative 1-Apr-20  Select copyrights 
Meedan MIT OCL 
Compatible 
20-Apr-20  Select patents 




OCL-P v1.1 OCL Standard 28-May-20  All patents 




Apache 2.0 OCL 
Compatible 
6-May-20  Select patents 




22-Apr-20  Select patents 
OVSI CERN OHL 
(S) v2.0 
OCL Alternative 23-Apr-20  All patents 
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Pledgor License License 
Category 
Date Rights Licensed 





21-Aug-20  All patents; All copyright 
Sandia National 
Laboratories 
Custom OCL Alternative 20-Apr-20  Select U.S. patents; 
available to U.S. persons 
only; expires June 30, 
2021 
SAP OCL-P v1.1 OCL Standard 6-Jun-20  All patents 
Seagate Technology 
plc 
OCL-P v1.1 OCL Standard 21-May-20  All patents 
SiFive OCL-PC 
v1.0 
OCL Standard 30-Apr-20  Select patents 
Skopos Labs CC BY 4.0 OCL 
Compatible 
9-Apr-20  No patents, copyright 
license only 
Tom Bihn, Inc. CC BY-SA 
4.0 
OCL Alternative 1-Sep-20  No patents, copyright 
license only 
Uber OCL-P v1.1 OCL Standard 24-Apr-20  All patents 
Unified Patents, LLC OCL-PC 
v1.0 





Universities Allied for Essential Medicines 
Mozilla 
DLA Paper 
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law, Center for Law and Biomedical 
Sciences 
Sage Bionetworks 
Laboratorio de Ideas sobre Propiedad Intelectual  
Stanford University Center for Compassion and Altruism Research and Education 
NEURO – Montreal Neurological Institute – Hospital 
American University Washington College of Law Program on Information Justice 
and Intellectual Property 
The Center for Artistic Activism 
CLAIMS Intellectual Property Lawyers 
ENGINE - The Voice of Startups in Government 
Open Knowledge Foundation 
Greek Free Open Source Society 
University of Houston Law Center –Health Law & Policy Institute 
National Information Standards Organization 
MITO Technology 
COMMUNIA - The European Thematic Network on the Digital Public Domain 
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Distributed Design Platform, Co-funded by the Creative Europe Programme of the 
European Union 
Global Alliance for Genomics & Health (GA4GH) 
Open Source Hardware Association (OSHWA) 
Rightcare Alliance  
Sagacious Global IP Research and Consulting Firm 
Guardian Project 






Intellectual Property Institute (IPI) 
LeapIP 
International Generic and Biosimilar Medicines Association 
Engineering World Health 
Clairvolex 
Young Moon 
University of Ottawa Centre for Health Law, Policy and Ethics 
Eifl Knowledge Without Boundaries 
Legal Advantage LLC Intellectual Property & Legal Support 
Centro Internacional en Docencia e Investigación Educativa (CIDIE) 
Commonwealth Peoples Association of Uganda 
Cognition IP 
Knowledge Futures Group 
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